Larry Garber published an opinion piece for the Middle East Institute on evaluating the various ‘Day After’ plans.

Our CIPS researcher, Jeffrey Liu, provides analysis of postwar plans for Gaza:

• Postwar Plans Executive Summary
• Issue-by-Issue Summary
• Postwar Plans Table
• Diplomacy Now Article, 5 November 2024, as part of this series on Day After arrangements

As background, our CIPS researcher, Shaikha Al-Thani has produced this report on the status of various territories in Palestine.

CIVIL SOCIETY POSITIONS

• Shira Efron & Michael Koplow, A Pragmatic Post-War Gaza Plan is Needed Now,The Liberal Patriot. June 5, 2024
• New Story Leadership Program, The Phoenix Plan (condensed version), June 2024 (expanded version available soon)
• Omar Shaban, Rebuilding Gaza: Considerations for a Habitable Future, Al-Shabaka, 19 May 2024
• Keith Dayton et al, Plan for Post-War Gaza, Wilson Center/Atlantic Council, May 2024
• Yair Hirschfeld and Yitzchak Gal, Rebuilding Gaza as Part of a Palestinian Economic Leap Plan and a Wider Regional Stabilization Process, May 2024
• INSS, The Day After: The Development of the War Requires Brave Decisions, 12 April 2024
• BICOM, Israeli Ideas for the Day After in Gaza, April 2024
• Palestinian Reconstruction and Economic Partnership (PREP), Palestine Emerging, launched April 2024
• Nabil Fahmy, For the day after, a 3-phase Gaza plan toward a two-state solution, Al-Monitor, 28 March 2024
• Shira Efron et al, A Humanitarian Plan for Gaza: Key Recommendations, Israel Policy Forum/Economic Cooperation Foundation, 25 March 2024
• Udi Dekel, “The Day After” Hamas’s Rule in Gaza: Time to Sober Up from the Illusions, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, 17 March 2024
• Lewis Libby, The Day After: A Plan for Gaza, Hudson Institute, 7 March 2024
• Mitvim Institute, The Israeli Initiative – How to turn the ongoing tragedy into a political-diplomatic turning point: A Roadmap for Long-Term Security, March 2024
• JINSA/Vanderberg Coalition, The Day After: A Plan for Gaza, 29 February 2024
• Muriel Asseburg, Shaping the Future of Gaza: How Europe could Contribute to Sustainable Stabilisation, Stiftung Wissenschaft un Politik, 9 February 2024
• Dennis Ross, The Road to Peace in Gaza: A Veteran Negotiator’s Plan, Washington Institute, 5 February 2024
• Salam Fayyad, A Plan for Peace in Gaza, Asharq Al-Awsat, 28 October 2023
• S Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward a Peaceful Two-State Solution, October 2016
• Nusseibeh – Ayalon Declaration of Principles, July 2002

OFFICIAL POSITIONS

 Israel

• Yoav Gallant, Defense Minister, Day After Hamas: Four Pillar Proposal, 4 January 2024 – see also here and here and here
• Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘The Day After Hamas’ paper, 22 February 2024; the original also here.

Palestine

• State of Palestine, Gaza Relief and Early Recovery Plan: Emergency Response Program (Month 0-6), May 2024

Hamas

• In May 2024, Hamas responded to an Israeli ceasefire proposal with its own general principles for an agreement.

United States

• In Tokyo, on 8 November 2023, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken set out certain ‘key elements’ for durable peace and security – the Tokyo Principles. These included no forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, no use of Gaza for terrorist attacks or threats, no reoccupation of Gaza after the conflict, no blockade or siege of Gaza, no reduction in territory of Gaza, the inclusion of the Palestinian people’s voices and aspirations in the post-crisis governance of Gaza, the Palestinian-led governance, Gaza unified with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority, a sustained mechanism for reconstruction in Gaza, and a pathway to Israelis and Palestinians living side by side in states of their own, with equal measures of security, freedom, opportunity, and dignity.
• On 8 January 2024, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken suggested that an agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia on normalization might be secured through commitment to a ‘practical pathway to a Palestinian state’.
• The United States announced a comprehensive Roadmap to a Permanent Ceasefire on 31 May 2024 which was then adapted into UN Security Council Resolution 2735. It remains to be seen whether the parties will accept this roadmap.
• On 8 June 2024, the United States issued a French-American Roadmap which expresses a commitment to a two state solution

Egypt

• On 5 May 2024, Egypt and Qatar put forward a ceasefire proposal as mediators, which was approved by Hamas, but ultimately rejected by Israel.
• The Egyptian proposal called for an initial ceasefire of up to two weeks during which Palestinian groups, including Hamas, would free 40-50 hostages, among them women, the sick and the elderly, in return for 120-150 Palestinians from Israeli prisons. Negotiations would continue on extending the ceasefire and further hostage and body release. Egypt and Qatar would work with all Palestinian factions, including Hamas, to agree on establishing a government of experts to rule Gaza and the West Bank for a transitional period, as Palestinian factions settle their disputes and agree on a road map to hold presidential and parliamentary elections.
• Egypt expressed support for the three steps set out in the US Roadmap to a Permanent Ceasefire

European Union

• On 22 January 2024, a 10-point roadmap advocated by Josep Borell was leaked to the press in connection with a Brussels Peace Summit. Subsequently, Josep Borell criticized the lack of engagement by Israel with the summit.
• EUSR Koopmans signaled plans to engage with regional stakeholders to seek consensus on elements for a comprehensive regional settlement based on a two-state solution, potentially through a ‘Preparatory Peace Conference’ that can demonstrate the benefits and shape of a durable peace in the Middle East, supported by the international community, to the conflict parties, and become the basis for a revived peace process.

Qatar

• The Qatari Prime Minister endorses the Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, as the best pathway to peace. This was recently affirmed through the Arab League in the Bahrain Declaration and the Riyadh Statement that arose from an Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit.

Saudi Arabia

• Saudi Arabia expressed full support for UN Security Council Resolution 2735
• Officially, Saudi Arabia remains committed to its 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and would establish diplomatic relations with Israel only after the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state. This was recently affirmed through the Arab League in the Bahrain Declaration and the Riyadh Statement arising from an Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit.

Türkiye

• In February 2024, Türkiye proposed a two-state solution with itself acting as an international guarantor.

League of Arab States

• The League of Arab States has expressed support for the Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. This was recently affirmed in the Bahrain Declaration, as well as the Riyadh Statement arising from an Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit. In the Bahrain Declaration, the Arab League also called for a UN peacekeeping force to be deployed in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank until a two-state solution can be negotiated, and for the UN Security Council to set a time limit for that political process.