

# Postwar Day-After Plans Executive Summary

Many postwar day-after plans for the conflict in Palestine have emerged since October 7<sup>th</sup>, 2023. However, these plans vary greatly their content, level of detail, and feasibility. Below are executive summaries of the most comprehensive plans and their key strategies for a postwar Gaza. A comprehensive annex is attached to this document which explores specific details of each plan in greater depth and compares them against one another. Plans are sorted by origin and an additional set of plans dealing with economic/humanitarian issues is also included. A link is provided to each plan in its title.

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## **Plans by States and International Organisations**

### **Netanyahu's Day After [Plan](#)**

An official plan from the Netanyahu government which gives broad strokes as to the future of Gaza. The plan primarily concerns itself with addressing Israeli security needs above all else. It calls for the complete demilitarisation of Palestine, total IDF operational freedom in both Gaza and the West Bank, and the closure of the border between Gaza and Egypt so that Israel can have complete control over what is received in Gaza.

The plan rejects the Palestinian Authority as a feasible governing force in Gaza and instead proposes a civil administration composed of locals with relevant experience. Security will be handled by Israel. The plan also calls for the dismantling of the UNRWA and the deradicalisation of Palestinians. The reconstruction and rehabilitation of Palestine is conditional on successful deradicalisation.

The plan does not address a final political settlement, details about governing arrangements, and security for Palestinians. It is focused almost exclusively on protecting and securing Israeli interests without considering Palestinian needs at all. It also does not mention foreign involvement at any point except for Egyptian cooperation with sealing the Southern Gazan border.

### **Biden's Peace [Plan](#)**

A brief official plan from the United States which was later adapted into [UN Security Council Resolution 2735](#). The plan outlines a roadmap towards a permanent ceasefire, exchange of hostages, and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The plan leverages further American-sponsored Israeli regional integration and the return of the remaining hostages for a ceasefire, a stopping of settlements, and withdrawal from Gaza. If Hamas agrees to the conditions of the plan, there will be an international effort to rebuild Gaza and a political process to discuss the long-term status of Palestine. The US pledges ensure Israeli compliance and Egypt and Qatar pledges to ensure Hamas' compliance should the two conflict parties agree to a ceasefire.

However, the plan does not address the future governance of Gaza, security for Israel or Palestine, nor does it comment on the future status of Palestinian statehood. Although there are pledges for international support for the reconstruction of Gaza, the plan lacks details as to what the international community is willing to provide and how reconstruction would look. The plan is primarily focused on reaching a ceasefire rather than envisioning a concrete day-after order.

### **Hamas' [Reply](#) to US Plan**

A very detailed plan by Hamas for arranging a ceasefire with Israel for the immediate conflict. The plan is divided into three 42-day phases. The most detailed is the first 42-day phase. This phase outlines a strict schedule for the release of hostages and prisoners of both sides of the conflict as well as a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and from the Rafah border. It also outlines the expectation that humanitarian aid and the work of the UNRWA will continue unimpeded in

Gaza. Reconstruction of the Gaza strip is to be overseen by international organisations like the UN and countries such as Egypt. In the latter two 42-day phases, the plan suggests ending the blockade of Gaza in the long run and a permanent ceasefire.

The plan does not address Israeli security concerns, nor does it outline what the future governance of Gaza and Palestine will look like. There is no discussion of Palestinian security.

### **Borrell's 10 Point Plan**

A plan by the EU, which remains unpublished, for a future day after plan. The plan outlines the framework for peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine for an end to the conflict and a political process for establishing an independent Palestinian state. It suggests that any conference ought to aim for a one-year timeline for establishing the framework for peace.

Most points outline areas that a future peace plan will need to cover including but not limited to: Gazan reconstruction, Palestinian and Israeli security, mutual recognition between Israel and Palestine, consent of the parties, hostage exchange, and enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. However, the plan lacks substantive discussions about any of these topics.

## **Plans by Israeli Think Tanks**

### **Israeli Policy Forum (IPF) Plan**

A detailed plan for postwar settlement, primarily focused on stabilising and establishing an Israel-aligned Palestinian government. It envisions a reformed Palestinian Authority taking over security and governance from the IDF in a phased manner, with the support of an international peace-keeping force drawn from Arab states. Although immediate postwar governance will be a Palestinian interim technocratic government drawn from local non-Hamas Palestinians and security will be managed by the IDF, the plan calls for the gradual transition of administration from the interim government and the IDF to a reformed Palestinian Authority which totally excludes Hamas and is composed of vetted and non-radical Palestinians experts. The exact details of this interim government will be determined at a US-convened regional conference that includes the EU and Arab states to decide upon a regional arrangement that ensures agreement on the form of the interim Palestinian government and long-term stability. It further calls for an implementable timetable for elections 1-2 years after the full transition of authority from the interim government and IDF to the Palestinian Authority.

The IPF plan also discusses the need for a US trained and vetted Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASAF) which will eventually take over security in Palestine and cooperate with the IDF to permanently eliminate Hamas and other terror groups which threaten Israel. It calls for eliminating martyr payments and other support to terrorists.

The IPF plan does call for the redesignation of 10% of Area C and all of Area B to become part of Area A. If the PASAF proves to be successful in managing security, the plan calls for curtailing IDF incursion into Area A as much as possible, ending settlement expansion, and releasing tax revenue collected in the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority.

The IPF plan is unique from other pro-Israeli proposals because it calls for the US to use its leverage to also force Israeli policy concessions towards Palestine to ensure a sustainable regional arrangement. It also views the UNRWA in a positive light and critical in transmitting humanitarian aid to Gaza, albeit stressing the need for reforms and gradually phasing out the UNRWA. However, the IPF plan calls for a halt to criminal proceedings against Israeli leaders in the ICC.

### **Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) [Plan](#)**

Another detailed pro-Israeli plan that emphasises Israel's security interests and international standing. The INSS plan suggests that postwar security and governance ought to remain in the hands of Israel until the Fatah, as the leader of the Palestinian Authority, can be reformed and established as a viable governing alternative to Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas must be strictly excluded from ever returning to power politically or militarily. Israel will recognise a Palestinian Authority as 'reformed' only when the PA recognises Israel as a legitimate state, stops financial support for the family of terrorists, ensures Hamas is out of power, allows Israel to maintain operational control over security, and halts legal proceedings against Israel in the ICJ and the ICC. Humanitarian aid is to be brought exclusively through Israel and distributed by either Israel or the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority to enhance the legitimacy of both entities. Humanitarian aid strictly cannot be distributed by either Hamas or other foreign powers.

Although civil governance will be administered by a reformed Palestinian Authority, security will remain firmly within Israeli hands in the long-term "... similar to the situation in Judea and Samaria." The IDF will be allowed total operational freedom and military capabilities of the Palestinian government is implied to be severely reduced under the plan. The plan also calls for the hermetic closure of the border between Gaza and Egypt so that Israel becomes the sole controller of goods and services entering and exiting Gaza.

In the event of failure by the Palestinian government to ensure this reality, the plan recommends direct Israeli military occupation until a more cooperative Palestinian government is formed which will agree to Israeli demands. However, the plan stresses that a military administration is only the second-choice option and prefers cooperating with the Palestinian Authority because Palestinian rule would secure more local buy-in and less resistance.

The INSS plan is unique because it greatly emphasises the importance of hostage return and also suggests that Israel be willing to make any concession to secure the release of remaining hostages because "Any concession that is reversible is a tactical concession, and there is no problem in agreeing to accept it." The plan explicitly suggests that even if Israel promises to an indefinite ceasefire with Hamas, Israel can always choose to continue the war later when all hostages have been secured. The INSS plan is also unique for its emphasis on the US playing a critical role in establishing and strengthening a regional order which is aligned against Iran and Iranian-backed militias.

### **Mitvim Institute [Plan](#)**

A detailed pro-Israeli plan focusing on sketching out a workable political process between Israel, Palestine, the US, and Arab states towards a stable two-state solution. The Mitvim plan

focuses on Israel ending future annexations, recognising the 1967 borders of Palestine, and assisting Palestine with regional economic integration. This is in exchange for Palestine recognising Israel, demilitarising and cooperating with Israel to fight terrorism, and reforming their government to eliminate extremist factions from taking power which do not recognise Israel or advocate for terrorism. This entire political process will be overseen by a modified Quartet (Russia being replaced by Arab states) that will ensure its implementation.

While the Mitvim plan is quite comprehensive, it lacks details about security arrangements. Despite advocating for security cooperation between Israel and Palestine in eliminating terrorism, it does not address local Palestinian policing forces, or Palestinian military capabilities, other than the requirement that Palestine must be a demilitarised state. It also does not address immediate humanitarian concerns in much detail.

## **Plans by Arab Think Tanks**

### **Al-Shabaka Plan**

A brief plan by the Palestinian Policy Network which is anchored in ensuring local Palestinian involvement and engagement with reconstruction and rebuilding after the war. It recommends establishing a Palestinian national committee for reconstruction, composed of experts from the private sector and civil society, as well as diverse political representation. The plan stresses the importance of Palestinian leadership in any project of rebuilding so as not to build up resentment against the committee for being foreign-led and viewed as an external imposition. There is no explicit mention of whether Hamas would be included in such an arrangement, but it does call for political reconciliation between all parties including Hamas and Fatah for there to be a representative and functional political process.

The primary proposal of the Al-Shabaka plan is an incremental approach towards reconstruction. Focusing on one collection of neighbourhoods at a time, the plan hopes that the residents of these communities be proactively engaged—both in decision-making as well as in implementation—to secure local buy-in and cooperation. In the long run, the plan emphasises rebuilding Gaza's productive sector, such as agriculture and export capabilities, will ensure that Gaza breaks out of the cycle of humanitarian dependency as swiftly as possible. However, the plan lacks substantive detail about how this long run vision will be achieved, and does not address the issue of security.

### **Salam Fayyad's Plan**

A brief plan by the former Palestinian Prime Minister which essentially calls for the acceptance and implementation of the Oslo Accords. Key to this plan is the mutual recognition between Israel and Palestine along the 1967 borders, reformation of the Palestinian Authority to be a more effective governing entity (albeit necessarily with Hamas representation to prevent violence), full Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank, and a commitment to non-violence from both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It ultimately aims towards a two-state solution. The future governance of Palestine, security concerns for both Israel and Palestine, future

reconstruction, and the long-term economic rehabilitation of Palestine are not discussed in substantive detail.

The Fayyad plan is unique insofar as it envisions the inclusion of Hamas in future governing arrangements within Palestine out of practicality. It argues that it is impossible to eradicate Hamas and therefore to exclude them from future governance is to invite conflict between Hamas and whatever authority ends up governing Palestine.

### **Nabil Fahmy's Plan**

A brief three-phase plan by the former Egyptian Foreign Minister. Phase one sees the exchange of hostages for a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. This phase also sees the immediate arrival of humanitarian aid, deployment of an international peacekeeping force, and the creation of an international reconstruction fund. Phase two sees Gaza and the West Bank, along the 1967 borders, placed into a UN trusteeship authorised by the UN Security Council. Phase three sees this UN trusteeship enter negotiations with Israel, lasting one to two years, with the express intent of establishing a permanent two state solution.

The Fahmy plan offers a feasible timeline as well as a legal mechanism for its implementation. However, it lacks details about security arrangements and does not address how Israel will be brought to the negotiating table and persuaded to accept the final two state outcome within the given timeline. The plan also does not sketch a plan for what Palestine will look like after the trusteeship is terminated. There is no mention of the role of Hamas.

## **Plans by American Think Tanks**

### **Hudson Institute Plan**

A brief plan which proposes a non-UN International Transitional Authority with the involvement of Arab states and US support. The focus of such an ITA is to ensure the immediate humanitarian crisis in Gaza is resolved and Gaza is de-radicalised. The Hudson plan aspires to exclude both Palestinians and Israelis from governing Gaza in the interim period. Instead, an advisory council of vetted Palestinian professionals will be supplementary to the governing body of the ITA. According to the Hudson plan, security will be handled by international volunteer forces and if those forces prove to be insufficient, the plan recommends employing private military contractors.

While the Hudson plan stresses that the ITA will be only an interim measure, the plan does not outline a future long-term governance structure for Gaza or Palestine. It also does not explain how the ITA will be administered, nor its legal mandate. The Hudson plan also does not address the mechanism for the termination of the ITA in the long run.

### **JINSA/Vandenberg Plan**

The JINSA/Vandenberg plan proposes the establishment of a trust which serves as an International Transitional Authority headed by the United States and Arab partners. The main goal of the trust is to engage in alleviating the immediate humanitarian crisis, manage the economic

reconstruction of Gaza, and prepare and train Gazans to eventually take over governance in the future. The trust will rely upon military support from foreign states and private military companies.

The JINSA/Vandenberg plan lacks a timeline and a political vision of the future and has no substantive discussion about Palestinian inclusion in present or future government. It also lacks details about policies to achieve its various objectives, such as deradicalisation, economic reconstruction, and eventual transition to a Palestinian government; and it does not address security in substantive detail.

### **Washington Institute for Near East Policy [Plan](#)**

A brief plan drawing on the experience of an American diplomat. The Washington Institute plan emphasises the importance of a demilitarised Palestine in the future to secure Israeli agreement. It also calls for the reform of the Palestinian Authority before governance can be returned to it. Specifically, the plan advocates the total exclusion of Hamas from political power in the present and future. The plan also calls for the establishment of an international humanitarian mechanism which will collaborate with local Gazans to coordinate the supply and distribution of aid.

Although the Washington Institute plan suggests a two-state solution in the long-term, it does not establish the boundaries of a future Palestinian state. The plan readily acknowledges that there will be Israeli opposition to returning to 1967 borders and acquiesces to that opposition. It does not address security concerns or provide security arrangements, nor does it discuss immediate postwar governance or economic rehabilitation.

### **'Wilson Center' [Plan](#)**

An extremely detailed plan which proposes the establishment of an International Transitional Administration (Multinational Authority or MNA), spearheaded by the US and Israel, with significant participation from the EU and Arab states. The 'Wilson' plan has the US working with a like-minded set of partners in the international community to form an international contact group that would oversee an authority that would go into Gaza to replace the IDF to provide governance for an interim transition for a non-defined Palestinian entity in the future.

The 'Wilson' plan lays out in detail the structure, goals, and strategies of the MNA, from developing mechanisms for the consultation of Gazan citizens, to deradicalisation, to the training of new security forces. The plan calls for an international peacekeeping force to take over immediate security whilst a new Palestinian policing force is vetted and trained. It argues that the Palestinian Authority is unfit for governance and transforms it into an advisory body. However, it advocates for actively involving local Palestinians with day-to-day operations of the MNA from acting as staff to local governors.

It also discusses how the MNA would aid in Gazan reconstruction in the near to intermediate term by reopening schools, opening Gaza to international banking, and supporting local businesses with subsidies. The plan suggests securing and expanding the import of aid and resources to Gaza from Egypt and Israel. It further proposes identifying non-Hamas Gazan businesspeople and supporting them with subsidies to restart the Gazan economy.

The 'Wilson' plan does not provide a mechanism for transitioning power from the MNA to a future Palestinian government. It also refrains from making any prior commitments to a political process, or comment on the future political status of Palestine.

## **Humanitarian/Economic Plans**

### **The Phoenix Plan**

A brief plan by former US officials. The most detailed and key component of the plan is the arrangement for postwar Palestinian governance. With no mention of the Palestinian Authority, the Phoenix plan calls for establishing a temporary, transitional Palestinian government of experts which will lead reconstruction efforts and eventually prepare the nation for democratic elections. The plan does not offer a timeline or modalities for how these local experts will be selected. Although the importance of humanitarian aid and reconstruction is noted extensively, there are no concrete details about modalities for delivering aid and reconstruction.

The Phoenix plan calls for the immediate demilitarisation of militias in both Gaza and the West Bank. No definition of militias is given. Although the plan asserts that both the temporary Palestinian government and the future democratically elected Palestinian government will have a monopoly of force over both the West Bank and Gaza, it also states that it anticipates extensive collaboration between the undefined future security forces of Palestine, international peacekeeping forces, and the IDF to ensure security.

### **Palestine Emerging Plan**

A very detailed plan about the economic development and rehabilitation of Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestine Emerging Plan outlines a model for the long-term economic development of a united Gaza and West Bank, located within a wider Levantine economic zone. The plan includes details about ideal infrastructural development, economic areas where Palestine can develop in the long run, resource sufficiency, and developing Palestinian soft power through film and sport. It also suggests novel ways of funding reconstruction such as a crowdfunded reconstruction bond, and a sovereign investment vehicle to manage donations and foreign aid.

The Palestine Emerging plan does not address any political and security issues. It consciously presumes that there will be an independent and integrated Palestine in the future that can adopt these recommendations. Further, the plan also does not detail how these projects can be realised in terms of funding, technical expertise, and existing infrastructural obstacles.

### **Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Plan**

A European comment which focuses on a realpolitik approach to the ending the current conflict. Whilst hesitating to produce a concrete plan, the comment outlines a possible political process which leverages Israeli and Palestinian interests for mutual recognition and regional stability. The SWP plan would like to see a two-state solution along the 1967 borders. It argues that a strong international commitment to a meaningful political process from the EU and the United States can be the key to ensuring fruitful negotiations.



The comment recommends that immediate postwar Palestinian governance be transferred to a technocratic government in the interim which will have the support of all Palestinian political factions including Hamas. In the long run, governance can hopefully be returned to the Palestinian Authority. The plan mainly makes recommendations for the EU to facilitate ongoing plans and suggestions of Arab states to achieve a workable regional solution, such as recent Qatari and Egyptian efforts to overcome Palestinian political infighting and establish such an interim authority.

The SWP plan makes no substantive comment about security arrangements within Palestine. Although it talks about possible European training of police and legal officials in Palestine in the intermediate term, the plan does not address the problem of Hamas or safeguarding Israeli security interests. The comment also lacks a vision and criteria for transferring power from the hands of the technocratic government to a future Palestinian government.

### **A Humanitarian Plan for Gaza**

A detailed plan for addressing immediate humanitarian issues in Gaza. It calls for expanded coordination between the Palestinian Authority, Israel, the Arab states, and the USA to more effectively deliver aid to Gaza. The plan prioritises ensuring that existing supply routes into Gaza, such as the Port of Ashdod and Kerem Shalom, are operating at full capacity. The plan also advocates for a proactive US role in lobbying for cooperation between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Arab states on humanitarian issues, especially in establishing rapid and effective measures at screening and distributing humanitarian aid entering Gaza. Further cooperation between all parties includes reconnecting Hamas-free parts of Gaza back to Israeli (and possibly Egyptian) power and water.

The plan lacks details about the future of Palestinian governance and key security issues. Its discussions of security are focused on preventing Hamas from expropriating aid but does not address long term Israeli security concerns. It also does not address how donor fatigue, especially from Arab states, will be overcome to secure funding for humanitarian efforts.