

Peace Plans Issue by Issue Summary

Despite the large number of peace plans by both public and private institutions, all plans address several key issues. These issues include the postwar governance of Palestine, postwar security or military arrangements for Palestine and Israel, the future status and role of Hamas, immediate humanitarian aid, reconstruction and long-term economic arrangements, and the long-term political status of Palestine. This document serves as a survey of how these issues have been treated by various plans. A comprehensive table detailing what each plan says about each issue and various sub-issues is attached.

Palestine Statehood

Around half of the plans explicitly demand the creation of an internationally recognised Palestinian state as part of the postwar arrangement, based on its 1967 borders. Most plans call for a ceasefire first and then negotiations between Palestinian representatives and the international community to finalise details for the borders and status of a Palestinian state. The other half of plans do not explicitly reject a Palestinian state but do not touch on moving towards a Palestinian state either. Some plans resist prescribing any position on the question of Palestinian statehood as it is considered beyond the purview of the plan. A notable exception is the Netanyahu plan which explicitly and categorically rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Postwar Governance

There are three commonly articulated perspectives on postwar Palestinian governance: governance by a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA), governance by another Palestinian group, and some kind of International Transitional Administration (ITA). The most popular suggestion is the governance of Gaza by a reformed PA.

Plans that call for the return of a reformed PA do so with the belief that the PA has the current legitimacy and infrastructure necessary to restore order to Gaza as soon as possible. No plan calls for a return to governing arrangements pre-October 7th. The INSS plan suggests that Fatah ought to lead a renewed PA to govern Gaza. The Mitvim Institute advocates for reformed PA governance. Salam Fayyad argues that the PA must be expanded to include all factions including Hamas and Palestinian Jihad to effectively govern postwar Gaza. Borell gestures that the PA's democratic legitimacy will need to be enhanced before eventually returning to government. "Towards a Sustainable Future for Gaza" suggests that the PA can appoint or recommend local experts for a transitional regime if they are not from the military wing of any political organisation but aims to eventually transition governing authority back to the PA. However, most plans which advocate for the return of the PA do not offer too many details about the specific reforms other than commitments to non-terrorism, eliminating corruption and establishing monitoring, and enhanced legitimacy.

There are also plans that propose non-PA Palestinian governance of Gaza. The Phoenix Plan calls for the establishment of a transitional locally sourced technocratic government. Similarly, the Rockefeller Foundation and Middle East institute suggest that an alternative government should be formed with the consultation of the PA. The SWP comment suggests that Hamas has

indicated agreement to transfer power to a technocratic Palestinian transitional government. The Netanyahu proposes that an alternative Palestinian government should be constituted of local Palestinians selected and vetted by either Israel or other international actors and stress that the PA has lost legitimacy and authority to govern.

Finally, there are plans which suggest establishing an ITA to govern Gaza with eventual transition to Palestinian governance in the long-term. The Hudson Institute and JINSA/Vandenberg, and Dayton Plans are the two primary proponents of this perspective, arguing that an ITA is the only way to reliably ensure that regional security needs are met, and that Hamas is kept out of power. However, both plans lack details about the conditions that need to be met to trigger a transition of authority back to Palestinians. The ITAs are generally meant to be spearheaded by the US with support from Arab states and Europe. The Israeli Policy Forum Plan calls for the establishment of an ITA as an interim measure before returning power to a reformed PA.

Political Dialogue or Process

There are two main proposals for political dialogue or process. The first proposal calls for a political dialogue between Israel, Palestine, and neighbouring Arab states to establish a Palestinian state in exchange for normalising relations between Israel and its neighbours. This view is taken by the Rebuilding Gaza Plan, the Mitvim Institute Plan and the Biden Three-Phase plan. The second proposal calls for negotiations between only Israel and Palestine to determine a long-term political arrangement. This proposal is supported by Nabil Fahmy and the SWP plan.

Security

The majority of plans accept that immediate postwar security will be handled by the IDF or Israeli forces. Notable exceptions to this are the Hamas plan and Nabil Fahmy's plan, which both explicitly call for immediate and total Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Apart from these two exceptions, most plans are concerned with how to transition immediate IDF-led security arrangements to other arrangements. These security arrangements involve permutations of continued Israeli military involvement in Gaza, Palestinian-led security, or international peacekeeping forces. The most common security proposal is the introduction of US trained Gazan police forces to manage security.

Both the Netanyahu plan and the INSS plan call for the demilitarisation of Gaza and total operational freedom for the IDF to counter terrorism in postwar Gaza and prevent the resurgence of Hamas' military power. The Washington Institute of Near East Policy plan likewise calls for the postwar demilitarisation of Gaza. Whilst the Mitvim Institute plan and the Phoenix plan both also call for the demilitarisation of Gaza, this serves as an interim measure until new Gazan security forces can be trained by the US. The Israeli Policy Forum plan, the INSS plan, a Humanitarian Plan for Gaza, Rebuilding Gaza, the Rockefeller Foundation and Middle East Institute plan, and the JINSA/Vandenberg plan all envision US trained Palestinian security forces working in collaboration with the IDF in the long term to manage security in Palestine. The SWP plan suggests that a Gazan police force could be trained by the EU instead.

Some plans also call for the creation of an international peacekeeping force. The Hudson Institute Plan and the JINSA/Vandenberg plan call for the use of private security forces alongside national forces in maintaining security in Gaza. The Dayton Plan, The Rockefeller Center Plan, Rebuilding Gaza Plan, and the Phoenix Plan refer to an international peacekeeping force drawing from neighbouring Arab states with the United States providing logistical support.

Role and Status of Hamas

Most plans call for the total elimination of Hamas' military capabilities and demand their exclusion from future governance. However, some plans argue that whilst Hamas should certainly be disarmed, it should still play some political role in the future governance of Gaza as it enjoys support amongst Palestinians. Salam Fayyad's plan, the Al-Shabaka plan, and the Phoenix plan make allowances for Hamas' participation in future Gaza governance in a non-violent capacity.

Hostages & Prisoners

Many plans presume that a ceasefire will inevitably include some kind of hostage/prisoner deal and therefore do not discuss it. However, the INSS and Nabil Fahmy plans specifically call for a hostage exchange as a means for achieving a ceasefire. Other discussions of hostages include Salam Fayyad's and the Mitvim Institute's calls for the immediate release of all hostages by Hamas and prisoners by Israel respectively as a confidence building measure for negotiations.

Humanitarian Issues

Most plans contain provisions for humanitarian aid, with some plans entirely dedicated to humanitarian issues. The vast majority of plans agree upon the kind of humanitarian aid to be provided, but largely differ on who will administer that aid, how aid will be distributed, and the role of the UNRWA.

The Israeli Policy Forum plan, the Hamas plan, the Palestinian Authority plan, Nabil Fahmy's plan, the Palestine Emerging plan, the Rockefeller center plan, the SWP plan, Rebuilding Gaza plan, a Humanitarian Plan for Gaza, and the JINSA/Vandenberg plan all call for the inclusion of the UN as a key actor in humanitarian aid distribution and seek to collaborate with the UNRWA in delivering aid. Although plans like JINSA/Vandenberg, a Humanitarian Plan, and Israeli Policy Forum suggest that the role of UNRWA should eventually be phased out over time, only the Netanyahu plan and the Hudson Institute plan call for the outright exclusion of the UNRWA.

As for how aid will enter the country, the Netanyahu plan, the Rebuilding Gaza plan, and the INSS plan call for aid to enter Gaza through Israel controlled entry points. The Israeli Policy Forum plan, JINSA/Vandenberg plan, and the Dayton plan, and A Humanitarian Plan for Gaza argue that an Israeli controlled point of entry should be opened in addition to existing points of entry for Humanitarian aid. The SWP plan suggests that the EU could assist in manning the Rafah entry point.

Aid distribution is another point on which plans differ. Aid distribution in Gaza is linked to legitimacy so the Rebuilding Gaza plan, INSS plan, and the Israeli Policy Forum plan actively call for the exclusion of Hamas in aid distribution and instead transfer aid distribution to their

preferred governing entity to bolster its legitimacy. Though most plans call for the free and open distribution and flow of aid throughout Gaza, the Humanitarian, Washington Institute, and SWP plans all call for the establishment of mechanisms to track where aid is ultimately provided to ensure that no aid is transferred to Hamas.

Reconstruction

Like with humanitarian issues, most plans agree on the critical infrastructure that needs to be redeveloped to ensure Palestine's long-term economic viability. After securing immediate humanitarian aid and returning displaced populations, plans generally first aim to restore basic infrastructure like energy, water, and waste disposal. The Palestinian Authority plan, the INSS plan, the Humanitarian plan, Dayton plan, and Palestine Emerging plan all call for these basic services to be initially imported from Israel and Egypt before Palestine establishes economic independence. Next, reconstruction aims to provide education, business subsidies, and promoting civil society development. In terms of detail, a notable outlier is the Palestine Emerging plan which charts a very long-term development plan that aims to transform Palestine into a leading regional economic player as opposed to being simply a moderately successful regional economy.

However, plans tend to differ upon the political conditions under which such reconstruction would occur, with plans conditioning economic reconstruction on satisfactory governance and security conditions. These differences have been explored in previous sections of this summary.