



UKRAINE INDICATIVE DRAFT SETTLEMENT

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in consultation with some Members of the

Cambridge Initiative on Peace Settlements *International Team of Experts*

The *Cambridge Initiative on Peace Settlements* offered a proposal for ending the war in Ukraine as soon as the conflict broke out, along with detailed contributions on individual aspects of a possible settlement from our international team of experts. This contribution introduces the text of a framework for a [draft settlement](#) in view of more recent developments.

Movement towards a Settlement

The original idea was to show that a settlement is possible and can be reached without further loss of life and suffering. In fact, a settlement sharing some of the elements that had been proposed in February 2022 was nearly achieved by the Russian Federation and Ukraine under Turkish facilitation some months later, in late March and early April of that year, at Istanbul.

With the withdrawal of Russian forces from Western Ukraine in April 2022, and the discovery of major alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ukrainian territories that had been under Russian occupation, the hopes for a settlement receded. Instead, international efforts focused on providing security guarantees that might be offered to Ukraine once the conflict concludes.

At the same time, the Russian strategy of attacking the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine, particularly the energy sector along with other civilian targets, has had its effect on the increasingly war-weary public. While the prospect of peace negotiations could not even be discussed in Ukraine a year or so ago, the mood is changing. Moreover, incoming US President Donald Trump has impelled his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, to offer negotiations, although ‘from a position of strength.’

President Putin has maintained for some time that the Russian Federation is ready to negotiate. However, he has emphasized that such negotiations must aim towards international acceptance of the territorial gains made by Moscow over the past three years. This result would be inconsistent with the international legal order, and would evidently be resisted by Ukraine.



Whether a fully-fledged peace settlement is possible therefore remains doubtful. It is of course possible that the outcome will be a simple cease-fire following the precedent of the Korean Armistice of 1953. Fighting would stop along the present line of confrontation, perhaps with some adjustments, including in the Kursk area where Ukrainian forces have penetrated Russian Federation territory. Perhaps some steps would be added to try and stabilize the situation. This could include measures to defuse incidents, perhaps a withdrawal of heavier forces from the line of confrontation, and possibly even the deployment of an international buffer force.

In such a situation, the Russian Federation might use the break in the conflict to rearm, while Ukraine too might seek to rebuild its arsenal with Western support. At best, a highly unstable situation would obtain, where a renewal of hostilities would be easily possible or even likely.

The alternative is a broader settlement that might meet the interests of both sides, at least for the mid-term. This would allow for a stabilization of the situation, the management of issues that arise in the immediate wake of the armed confrontation, and international steps supporting implementation of a settlement. This might be followed by a broader, pan-European settlement some years down the line, addressing the broader dimensions of the conflict, conventional armament in Europe and other matters. Territorial issues affecting Ukraine might be addressed in a more definite way within that context, much as the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe endorsed the post-World War II order in Europe.

Options for a Draft Settlement

This draft settlement proposed here chooses among the available options for settlement of a range of issues. This is not meant to suggest that the options chosen will necessarily be the ones accepted in the end by the sides, or that the sides should settle in line with this text. Rather, the idea is simply to show roughly what an agreement might in the end look like, and what elements it would need to contain. A larger study that will accompany this draft in due course will analyze each of the elements of a potential settlement, discusses alternative options on each major issue, and explains why this initial draft has adopted one particular option over another.

Key Elements

The draft agreement provides for a comprehensive and permanent cease-fire, followed by withdrawals of the sides from a zone of 7.5 kilometres from each side of the Provisional Line of Control. An International Disengagement Mission of a strength of up to 7,500 personnel drawn from states acceptable to both will be deployed in that 15 km-wide Disengagement Zone. The sides will withdraw heavy weapons to a minimum distance of 35 km from the Line of Control and will not fly manned or unmanned aerial vehicles in the area.

The Provisional Line of Control, and hence the Disengagement Zone, will be adjusted to form the definite Line of Control after the comprehensive, permanent cease-fire has



been established. This includes a withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from areas that were under the control of the Russian Federation as of 22 February 2022 (Kursk region), and a corresponding withdrawal of Russian Federation and associated forces from areas along the Provisional Line of Control. This may include areas that have been traditionally inhabited by a majority of individuals whose habitual first language is not Russian. These areas will be clearly designated in an annex to the agreement.

Previously, a significant range of alternative solutions relating to territories occupied in 2014 and since February 2022 were proposed. Early in the conflict, Russian-led autonomy for the Donbas region within the overall (nominal) sovereignty of Ukraine could have been possible. Subsequently, there was the idea of a lease-back of territory—Ukraine’s sovereignty would be confirmed while Kyiv would accept a Russian Federation presence on the territory for a long period. However, since September 2022, when the Russian Federation formally purported to incorporate the four additional Oblasts it has occupied, the Russian Federation insists that this incorporation into its sovereign state territory and constitutional system must be acknowledged in any outcome.

Such acknowledgement remains impossible in view of the position of international law on annexations obtained through force. If the Russian Federation insists on this point, no deal could (or should) be possible, also for the Trump White House. Hence, the only possible solution is to defer the issue of status of territory, at least until a final settlement might be reached with the context of a larger, Pan-European Conference and Security and Cooperation in Europe a fair number of years down the line.

Ukraine has seemingly confirmed its willingness to accept such a *de-facto* outcome. While this would not prejudice its *de jure* position, Ukraine would be ready to give a binding undertaking not the use of force to recapture the territory (one recalls Azerbaijan’s successful armed campaign of 2020/23 to recapture Ngorno Karabakh after decades of occupation by Ajerbaijan).

Accordingly, the draft agreement avoids any suggestion concerning the status of the territories that have fallen under the control of the Russian Federation since 2014. It simply provides for the administration of the territories under the control of each side under the agreement, including arrangements for the protection of non-dominant groups, the return of property or compensation for its loss, and cross-line cooperation.

Under the deal, Ukraine could progress on its path towards EU integration but pledges not to seek NATO membership, at least until the convening of a Pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation to be held in between five to fifteen years. This conference would discuss a new system of cooperative security for Europe, limitations of conventional armaments in Europe, outstanding issues of the territorial order of Europe and other issues. Ukraine would however be entitled to engage in defence cooperation with any defensive alliance, including training and joint exercises. Training missions with such alliances on Ukrainian territory are however limited in terms of time and numbers involved and there would be no deployment of NATO forces on Ukrainian territory.



Under this design, Ukraine could still cooperate bilaterally with any state it chooses, including NATO members, in preparing for its defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the already existing defence cooperation agreements. This would essentially reflect the design of the Yermak/Rasmussen plan for deep cooperation in terms of defence industries, supplies, training, etc. However, there would be no permanent deployment of foreign forces on the territory of Ukraine beyond a certain number of military/technical personnel from individual states, say around 1000. Ukraine would not seek to acquire missiles or other unmanned aerial delivery vehicles beyond a range of 250 km.

The agreement would be supported by a Group of Supporting States composed of the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy, of Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and Belarus, China, India, Brazil and South Africa. These would help ensure compliance, arrange an International Fund to finance the arrangements foreseen in the agreement, and consider issues relating to the gradual relaxation of economic measures imposed against the Russian Federation in the context of the present conflict.

The UN and possibly the OSCE would be associated with this Group. The International Disengagement Mission could be arranged as a UN-led peace-keeping force, it could be a UN-mandated force under OSCE guidance, or a force with a delegated UN mandate supervised by the Group of Supporting States.

Should any side resume the conflict, an arrangement for the automatic snap-back of sanctions could be constructed. While this might be difficult to accept for the Russian Federation, Ukraine and its allies could insist that the UN Security Council Resolution that would endorse the settlement under Chapter VII provides for sanctions that would be brought into force automatically, and universally, should a further armed attack occur.

As confirmed by President Trump (and already asserted by many other NATO members) there would be no Article 5-like NATO security guarantee. However, as noted, there would be EU membership for Ukraine, which also has certain security implications, along with bilateral security cooperation with individual states, including NATO members.

Issues not Fully Addressed

The proposal merely provides for a framework for a mid-term agreement. Necessarily, this framework cannot cover the highly detailed provisions, for instance relating to the technical aspects of the permanent cease-fire that would need to be provided. Such details on this and other elements of the agreement would need to be addressed in detailed annexes, which would be part of the agreement.

The text of the agreement proposed here leaves out, or only addresses in part, the one or other issue of significant interest to the sides and to some third states. It is unlikely that these could be addressed directly in such an initial agreement.



As already noted, the draft avoids any pronouncement on the legal status of the contested territories between the sides. Ukraine will insist on huge compensation payments ranging in the trillions of dollars. The Russian Federation will reject any notion of compensation.

The proposal includes some softer ways of circumnavigating this issue which are discussed in greater detail in the longer study. For instance, the Russian Federation would bear all costs concerning property lost in areas that have fallen under its control and will make additional significant contributions to the International Fund established for rehabilitation, reconstruction, damages and other purposes over a period of ten years.

Similarly, much international attention is being paid to the issue of personal accountability for launching the war, and for the way it has been conducted. War crimes prosecutions at the national and international level are advancing, with the prospect of the creation of a special criminal tribunal on the crime of aggression by the Council of Europe or some of its members looming for April. It is difficult to see President Putting signing a peace agreement at the moment when key supporting states are establishing an international tribunal specifically aiming to try him for launching an aggressive war.

Rather, the Russian Federation will demand that it, and its officials, including its President, must be released from any such liabilities in a settlement. However, it is clear that the sides, and even potential Supporting States, lack the legal authority to remove the threat of criminal or civil action in all national or international courts. While it is up to the sides to determine whether they will or will not pursue war crimes allegations in their domestic courts, it is no longer possible to offer international amnesties, even if that would appear to some morally acceptable or even desirable in order to achieve peace. At most, the UN Security Council can suspend proceedings in the International Criminal Court at The Hague for a year at a time. The Supporting States might also commit to abstain from creating additional accountability mechanisms concerning the crime of aggression, however painful this would be for those who have invested immense efforts in this project.

Generating a Settlement Process

President Trump has already initiated sperate (telephone) conversations with President Putin and President Zelenskyi, confirming their willingness to reach a peace agreement. One option would be for the US to continue separate discussions with the sides, followed by the relatively rapid presentation of a draft agreement for their consideration. Whichever sides does not accept the text would select itself for hostile US action, taking the form of either further sanctions against the Russian Federation, or a withdrawal of any further US assistance to Ukraine.

In the alternative, the US might join with the already established mediators in this instance, like Turkey and Qatar, or now Saudi Arabia, and arrange a more consensual process. If so, it is likely that there would need to be working groups facilitated by the mediation, each addressing one of the issue areas covered in the sections of the draft



settlement noted here. Given the complexity of the issues involved, this may however take many months, rather than the 80 to 100 days foreseen by the Trump administration.

It might be possible to agree on a temporary cease-fire, pending the negotiation of a mid-term political agreement and a permanent end to the conflict of the kind proposed here. The risk is that this might freeze the conflict, without the sides every reaching a political settlement.

Any mediation effort would need to be backed up by a Contact Group of Supporting States. In addition to the US, UK, Germany, France and Italy, this might include traditional supporters of mediation like Norway, Sweden, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland, and states closer to the Russian Federation, perhaps like Belarus, China, India, South Africa and Brazil. The effort would also need to involve the United Nations and potentially the OSCE.

Previously, the sides have had no hesitations to negotiate directly, face to face. Perhaps this might make it unnecessary to conduct indirect or 'proximity' negotiations where they might assemble in the same building, but meet in separate rooms, with the mediators shuttling between them. However, given the grave human costs that have been imposed upon the sides by the conflict since the initial negotiations of Spring 2022, a three-step approach might be called for.

First, the mediation might assemble proposals and suggestions by the sides in relation to the issue areas noted here (and others they may wish to bring up) through informal discussions followed by shuttle diplomacy or indirect talks. Based on these positions, the mediation would then develop non-papers, outlining how the diverging positions of the sides might be bridged. Based on feedback from the sides, the mediators could then draw up an initial outline skeleton for a settlement, offering draft language where the parties are close, and alternative options where they are not. This approach would avoid confronting them with a text that might cross their 'red lines' at the outset.

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INDICATIVE CONSULTATION DRAFT

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED AND DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND UKRAINE, HAVE THIS DAY, THE 22ND OF APRIL 2025, CONCLUDED THIS

**FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
AND THE RESUMPTION OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND UKRAINE**

IN THE PRESENCE OF THE UNDERSIGNED WITNESSES

PREAMBLE

Conscious that the continuation of armed confrontation can only lead to further loss of life and destruction;

Committed to achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace between our two countries;

Recognizing the legitimate existence of Ukraine and the Russian Federation as sovereign and independent states;

Desirous to return in our mutual relations to the full and comprehensive application of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, including sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-use of force, non-intervention and exclusively peaceful settlement of disputes;

Committed to taking effective steps towards preventing the resumption of violence between our two nations in the future,

Aiming towards the gradual restoration of friendly relations between our two states and peoples;



Aware that the restoration of peaceful relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine can be the starting point for the development of a New Pan-European Security Order;

Acting without prejudice to the divergent positions of both states concerning the status of certain territories that have been the object of armed confrontation;

IT IS AGREED THAT:

I. PERMANENT CEASE-FIRE

Article 1. Instituting the Permanent Cease-fire

- (i) Upon entry into force of this agreement the sides will engage in a complete, comprehensive and permanent cease fire. They will give clear instructions to maintain strict compliance with the cease-fire by all regular or irregular forces or formations under their control and will rigorously enforce those instructions. They will not mount any offensive operations and will respond only with minimum force strictly necessary for personal self-defence in case of any incident or armed attack committed by the other side, which will be immediately reported to and addressed by the respective Joint Military Liaison Office for that region (Article 1 (iv)). They will also ensure that no armed actions against the other side are undertaken by any other armed groups or individuals emanating from territory under their control.
- (ii) If there is a delay between signature of the agreement by the sides and entry into force, a provisional cease-fire compliant with the provisions of this Article shall be established upon signature. The steps outlined below in this article shall be undertaken at the time of signature in any event.
- (iii) They sides will establish permanent and resilient communication links across the line of contact at field level, at headquarters level, and at a political level, to ensure that no infractions of the cease-fire occur and, should they occur, that they can be immediately terminated.
- (iv) The sides will establish local Joint Military Liaison Offices in all regions of contact between the respective forces of the sides. These will serve as first responders to any reports of infractions of the cease-fire, with the aim of clarifying facts, terminating infractions, preventing escalation and taking steps towards preventing further infractions.
- (v) The Joint Military Liaison Offices will take immediate steps to determine and designate the existing line of contact between the armed forces of the sides, to be designated as the Provisional Line of Control, and to draw up plans to effect the initial withdrawal foreseen in Article 2, and the potential changes to the line of control foreseen in Article 4.
- (vi) The sides will also establish a Joint Military Commission. The Joint Military Commission will approve the Provisional Line of Control designated by the



Joint Military Liaison Offices, plan for and supervise the initial withdrawal foreseen in Article 2 and the potential adjustment foreseen in Article 4. It will receive reports on the status of the cease-fire from the Joint Liaison Offices and consider steps to enhance its stability and effectiveness. It will intervene where a Joint Liaison Office has been unable to address infractions or incidents in its respective region effectively.

- (vii) The Joint Military Commission and the Joint Military Liaison Offices will be staffed by an equal number of qualified officers from each side, and a similar number of international staff nominated by the International Disengagement Mission (Article 3 below), with one senior member of the Mission holding the Chair.

Article 2. Initial Withdrawals

- (i) Within three days of the entry into force of the cease-fire, each side shall withdraw all its forces, whether regular or irregular, along the Provisional Line of Control by one km, as designated by the relevant Joint Military Liaison Office and approved by the Joint Military Commission. Patrols consisting of one officer of each of the sides and one international member of the International Disengagement Mission shall enjoy full access to the areas subject to the withdrawal and verify compliance.
- (ii) Within ten days of the entry into force of the cease-fire, each side shall withdraw all its forces, whether regular or irregular, 7.5 km from the Provisional Line of control as designated by the relevant Joint Military Liaison Office and approved by the Joint Military Commission as the Zone of Disengagement. Patrols consisting of one officer of each of the sides and one member of the International Disengagement Mission shall enjoy full access to the areas subject to this withdrawal and verify compliance.
- (iii) Within 15 days of the entry into force of the cease-fire and in accordance with Annex 2, each side shall withdraw heavy weaponry 35 km from the Provisional Line of control as designated by the relevant Joint Military Liaison Office and approved by the Joint Military Commission (Heavy Weapons Exclusion Zone). Patrols consisting of one officer of each of the sides and one international member shall enjoy full access to the areas subject to this withdrawal and verify compliance.
- (iv) The sides shall maintain, and the International Disengagement Mission shall monitor and if needed enforce, a strict no-fly zone for manned and unmanned aircraft of any kind of the sides, including drones, in the Zone of Disengagement.
- (v) If the Line of Control is to be adjusted in accordance with Article 4, or subsequently by agreement of the sides and with the approval of the Group of Supporting States, the withdrawal areas and Zone of Disengagement will be adjusted accordingly as proposed by the relevant Joint Liaison Offices and endorsed by the Joint Military Commission.

Article 3. International Disengagement Mission



- (i) An International Disengagement Mission shall be deployed in the Zone of Disengagement as the Zone is vacated by the sides. This deployment shall occur in a front-loaded way, ensuring that no security vacuum develops along the present line of contact.
- (ii) The mission shall consist of a maximum of 7,500 military and civilian personnel and foreign support staff who shall be deployed throughout the Zone of Disengagement. The Mission shall be accommodated in the Zone of Disengagement with rearward facilities being made available by the sides in their support.
- (iii) The sides consent to the presence and activities of the International Disengagement Mission and the Status of Forces Agreement including arrangements for immunities, entry and exit of personnel, equipment and supplies, communications, access, etc, (Annex 4) through their consent to this agreement. The Status of Force Agreement enters into force upon signature of this agreement. The consent thus given can only be removed by agreement of both sides.
- (iv) The International Disengagement Mission shall be deployed pursuant to a Chapter VII mandate to be requested of the United Nations Security Council (Annex 1). The mandate shall extend in time until it is revoked by a decision of the Council.
- (v) The Group of Supporting States (Article 12 below) will determine whether the force will operate as a UN peace-keeping force, or whether it will be managed by the OSCE, or by the Group of Supporting States itself, with cover of a Chapter VII mandate. The force will consist of contingents from force-contributing states acceptable to the sides. The force commander and Head of the International Disengagement Mission will be designated by the UN Secretary-General or the Secretary-General of the OSCE, depending on the decision taken.
- (vi) No armed forces or armed formations of the sides shall enter the Zone of Disengagement without express consent from the head of the International Disengagement Mission. Each side may maintain a minimal police presence on its side of the Line of Control within the Zone of Disengagement, with numbers to be set for each region by the Joint Military Liaison Offices, to assist in maintaining ordinary civilian life.
- (vii) While undertaking the initial withdrawals foreseen in Article 2, the sides undertake to remove any mines, unexploded ordinance, explosives or other potential hazards. If any such hazards remain despite the best effort to remove them, these shall be duly designated, with the locations clearly marked and communicated to the relevant representatives of the International Disengagement Mission.
- (viii) The International Disengagement Mission shall include a political component, supporting the restoration of civilian life in the Area of Disengagement, monitoring performance of human and minority rights by the respective authorities, assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid and reconstruction services, demining, and encouraging the voluntary return of residents who wish to return.



- (ix) The International Disengagement Mission shall report monthly on developments in the Area of Disengagement to the UN Security Council/OSCE Secretariat, and more frequently if circumstances so warrant.

Article 4 Adjustments to the Line of Control

- (i) A Schedule concerning adjustments to the Provisional Line of Control, and hence the Zone of Disengagement (Articles 2 and 3) and the Heavy Weapons Exclusion Zone (Article 3 3 (iii)), is attached to this agreement (Annex 3). This provides for a full withdrawal of Ukrainian forces or any other formations under their control from the territory of the Russian Federation in the Kursk or any other area (line of 22 February 2022). In parallel, the Schedule provides for withdrawals of Russian Federation forces or any other formations under their control from specified areas along the Provisional Line of Control. This may include areas inhabited before 1 January 2014 by a majority of individuals habitually speaking a first language other than Russian.
- (ii) The adjustment of the Provisional Line of Control and the associated areas shall be completed within three months of the coming into force of this agreement. It will be arranged and supervised by the Joint Military Commission, which will report on timely implementation to the Group of Supporting States.
- (iii) Article 3 (v) applies in full to the areas covered by these above provisions.

Article 5. Prisoners of War, the Detained and the Deceased

- (i) The sides shall form a Joint Commission on Repatriation upon entry into force of this agreement, composed of an equal number of representatives of the sides and a Secretariat. A further three members shall be nominated by the Head of the International Disengagement Mission.
- (ii) The Group shall avail themselves of the services of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in conducting its work. The ICRC shall be invited to nominate a further three members of the Commission.
- (iii) Within one month of the entry into force of this agreement, the sides shall present to the Commission a complete list of all individuals, whether Russian Federation citizens, Ukrainian citizens, or others, detained in consequence or in the context of the present conflict. Prisoners of war shall be listed separately.
- (iv) All civilians detained in the context of the present conflict shall be released within three months of the entry of this agreement into force and enabled to return to their habitual place of residence, or any other place in Ukraine or the Russian Federation, as they may wish. This includes children who were removed from the area of confrontation, including any sent to the Russian Federation, whose fate shall be addressed by a special task force within the Commission.
- (v) The Joint Commission on Repatriations shall supervise this process and address any contested cases concerning civilian detainees. It shall report



monthly on compliance or non-compliance to the Group of Supporting states. It may receive and act upon petitions from individuals concerned, including relatives or others associated with the detained.

- (vi) Prisoners of war shall be repatriated within three months of the conclusion of this agreement. Where a prisoner of war has been tried and sentenced for war crimes or other crimes connected with the hostilities by the courts of one of the sides, or any other crimes or offences, or is to be so tried, their case file shall be submitted to the Commission on Repatriations. The Commission will establish a senior Legal Review Chamber staffed with independent jurists in the field of the law of armed conflict to conduct a legal review of the relevant cases. Where it finds that there was no sound legal process, or an otherwise unjustified conviction or indictment, the individual concerned shall be immediately released and included in the repatriation. The same applies in relation to individuals who have been severely mistreated and/or subjected to torture at any point since the commencement of their detention. No review of an individual case file by the Legal Review Chamber shall take longer than three months.
- (vii) The Commission shall maintain a register of individuals whose fate has not been resolved, whether military personnel or civilians. It shall maintain a unit charged with actively tracing any persons placed on that list by the sides or concerned individuals or at its own initiative, with a view to resolving their fate and, if still alive, ensuring repatriation in accordance with the above provisions.
- (viii) The Commission shall supervise arrangements for the repatriation of the war dead where this is wished and possible. In all other cases, it shall ensure that the final resting place of the dead is appropriately laid out and marked in a dignified way, including identification of the dead and recording of the location of their grave. The sides shall enable easy access for those wishing to visit the final resting place of their relatives.
- (ix) The Commission shall assist in the identification, and where necessary and wished for by close relatives, reburial, of civilian dead.

II. MUTUAL RELATIONS

Article 6. Principles of the UN Charter

- (i) The sides will conduct their mutual relations in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, including self-determination, individual and collective self-defence, human rights and equal treatment of all, sovereign equality, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force and territorial integrity.
- (ii) The sides expressly and unambiguously reject the use of force in their future mutual relations. They will resolve all disputes that may arise between them, or that may have already arisen, including territorial questions, exclusively through diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes.



- (iii) Ukraine remains committed to the principles of democracy, good government and public accountability. The sides reject extremism, intolerance and associated ideologies of hatred and exclusion, including Naziism. Ukraine invites a report by the Council of Europe on measures it could take to strengthen its commitments on these points yet further.
- (iv) Ukraine will review its legislative provision for those whose first language is not Ukrainian in accordance with the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Language Charter. It will consider steps that might be taken to improve its legislative provisions and practices in this respect yet further, in dialogue with the Council of Europe Advisory Committees attached to these two instruments.
- (v) Ukraine will continue along its path towards European integration, including EU membership.
- (vi) Ukraine will not seek NATO membership unless such a step is approved by the New Pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe foreseen in Article 14. It will instead contribute to the development of international peace and security through the United Nations, the OSCE or its successor organization, and the global non-aligned movement.

Article 7. Principles Governing Military Cooperation for Ukraine

- (i) Ukraine remains free to develop cooperative relations with any defensive alliance short of membership, including receiving assistance in preparation for its defence, paying strict regard to Article 6 (ii). This includes training, participation in joint exercises and manoeuvres conducted with any defensive alliance, including on the territory under its control, but subject to Article 2 (iii). Such joint exercises and manoeuvres on the territory under the control of Ukraine shall not involve foreign forces in excess of 7,500 personnel and shall not last longer than three months, or, taken together, shall not take up more than three months in any given year.
- (ii) Ukraine may continue to maintain bilateral military contacts and arrangements with any state, in line with the bilateral military cooperation arrangements in place already and further such agreements as may be concluded. However, subject to Articles 3 and paragraph (i) of this Article, Ukraine shall not allow the presence of more than 1,000 military/technical personnel associated with the armed forces of external states under such bilateral cooperation agreements, or any other state, on the territory under its the control.
- (iii) Ukraine once more permanently renounces the possibility of the acquisition of nuclear weapons and will continue to comply will all applicable standards of the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA), including its inspection regime. Ukraine invites and will fully facilitate without any condition a special and comprehensive IAEA inspection, to confirm that it has never the past sought a nuclear weapons potential, to issue its final report within one year of the entry into force of this agreement.



- (iv) Ukraine reiterates its permanent commitments to the existing international agreements and mechanisms prohibiting the possession, production and use of chemical and biological weapons, including the relevant verification mechanisms.
- (v) Ukraine will not acquire missile or other unmanned aerial vehicles of a range in excess of 250 kilometres. Any additional limitations on the deployment or possession of conventional armaments, or maximum numbers of troops, shall be considered in the context of Article 13 (c) (iii).
- (vi) Ukraine will not participate in any military operations outside of its own area of control as established in this agreement, unless so authorized by a United Nations Security Council mandate or a mandate of the OSCE or its successor organization.

III. TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

Article 8. Administrative Arrangements

- (i) The sides will continue to provide for civil administration of the territories on their respective side of the Line of Control. They shall provide for a special administrative status of the regions of Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, Kherson and Mykolayiv to promote stability, rapid recovery and reconstruction, equal rights for all with special protection for members of non-dominant groups, and voluntary returns of those displaced in consequence of the present conflict.
- (ii) The sides will provide for the rights of non-dominant groups in these regions in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Framework Agreement for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Language Charter.
- (iii) The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities will be charged with supporting the implementation of such rights. He/she shall receive information on the practices of the sides in the relevant territories, including information furnished by affected individuals and their representatives, and report every two months to the Group of Supporting States on implementation.
- (iv) The UN High Commissioner for Refugees shall monitor the steps taken by the sides to encourage and facilitate the voluntary returns of those displaced by the present conflict who wish it.
- (v) The sides shall cooperate with one another and with the International Atomic Energy Commission in relation to nuclear installations and their safety within their respective areas of control.
- (vi) The sides shall conclude further agreement aiming to enhance cooperation across the Line of Control, where this is in the interest of the local populations or both sides. This may include the provision of basic services, like energy, water, etc., and provisions concerning transport and communication, facilitating easy crossings of the Line of Control for farm or factory workers, etc.



Article 9. Restitution of Property and Compensation in relation to Certain Areas

- (i) This Article shall apply to loss or damage suffered by individuals or corporations in areas that have come under the control of a side in consequence of the present conflict or of the armed activities that commenced in 2014.
- (ii) The sides will ensure that those displaced, or dispossessed of their property, in consequence of the conflict, have their property restored to them. Returnees will be eligible for accelerated recovery assistance, to be provided from the International Fund (Article 12 (vi)).
- (iii) A Joint Property Commission shall be established within three months of the entry into force of this agreement. The Commission may draw on the information already assembled by the UN Register of Damages Caused. The Commission will be staffed by three appointees of each of the sides, and six appointees of the International Disengagement Mission, which shall also appoint the Chair and Deputy from its appointees and furnish a Secretariat.
- (iv) Returnees claiming that their property has not been fully and effectively restored may apply to the Joint Property Commission for an enforcement order of their claim, or in the alternative for appropriate compensation.
- (v) Where individuals chose not to opt for voluntary return, a register of the property they held by individuals lost before their departure shall be maintained by a Joint Property Commission.
- (vi) Appropriate compensation for lost real estate, the new book value at the time of companies and other undertakings taken or destroyed, and other property valued in excess of USD 5,000, destroyed or lost due to the conflict, shall be awarded by the Joint Property Commission:
 - (a) should the owners wish to relinquish their property rights;
 - (b) for losses incurred by owners who do not wish to return but are unwilling to relinquish their property rights;
 - (c) or, if they have returned and their property has not been restituted within six months of their return, or within three months of having obtained an enforcement order from the Commission, should they wish to relinquish their claim of restitution at that point.

This mechanism shall remain in place until such time as a final settlement is agreed (Article 13 (iii) (f)). Should they still be unwilling to return and exercise their property rights in person at that point, they shall, again, be eligible for appropriate compensation for the loss of property which shall, at that point, be automatic.

- (vii) The awards of the Joint Property Commission may be made through a simplified lump-sum procedure concerning certain classes and types of properties and its approximate value and will be satisfied by the International Fund within three months of being rendered.

IV. RECONCILIATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY



Article 10. Reconciliation

- (i) Reconciliation is a difficult task in the wake of any destructive conflict. However, it is a task that must be attempted in the interest of addressing the hurt experienced by so many, and in the interest of rebuilding relations between the states concerned.
- (ii) The sides will each study the question of how reconciliation can be best fostered under the present, challenging circumstances. Within one year of the entry into force of this agreement, they will form a Joint Commission on Fostering Good Neighbourly Relations. That Commission, composed of an equal number of members from each side and a similar number of international experts, will draw on experiences with reconciliation after violent conflict in other places and develop a plan of activities with the aim of encouraging people-to-people activities, along with a programme of confidence building between both states.
- (iii) The International Fund will provide funding for activities proposed by the Commission at the level of one third of projected cost, with each of the sides contributing another third.

Article 11. Accountability

- (i) The sides are united in condemning grave breaches of the laws of armed conflict and related offences, including crimes against humanity and may, each under its domestic law, prosecute such offences. There shall be no further *in absentia* proceedings, however.
- (ii) International law does not permit the award of blanket amnesties for grave breaches of the laws of armed conflict and related offences (crimes against humanity, including gender-based crimes, genocide, ethnic cleaning, etc). However, the UN Security Council will be invited to consider whether to act under Article 16 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in view of progress in implementing the terms of this agreement year-on-year.
- (iii) Members of the Group of Supporting States will not participate in, or vote for, the establishment of additional accountability mechanisms not yet in existence.
- (iv) Ukraine will withdraw any case or cases concerning the present conflict from the International Court of Justice and the Russian Federation will not bring any counter-claims or new case.

V. INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 12. Group of Supporting States

- (i) The implementation of this agreement shall be accompanied by a Group of Supporting States. The following states shall be invited as original members of the group: Belarus, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the



Kingdom of Norway, Qatar, the People's Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Sweden, Turkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America. Other states making notable contributions to the stabilization, rehabilitation and reconstruction effort in the region of present conflict may be invited to join the Group by a two-thirds majority vote of its members. The EU, the UN and the OSCE shall be invited to participate in the meetings of the Group without a vote.

- (ii) The Group of Supporting States shall meet monthly in Vienna at senior Ambassadorial level, every six months at the level of Political Directors, and once a year at the level of Foreign Ministers or Head of State or Government. It may be called to meet at other times within two days of a request by either of the sides, or by any three of its members.
- (iii) The Group of Supporting States shall maintain a Permanent Secretariat in Vienna. The Group will be supported by an Executive Secretary and two Deputies, selected from among the participating states with the affirmative vote of two thirds of the members of the Group, in consultation with the sides. There will be a small Permanent Secretariat in support of the work of the Group of Supporting States.
- (iv) The Group of Supporting States shall establish the subsidiary bodies, or contribute to the bodies, noted in this agreement, including the Joint Military Commission and Joint Military Liaison Offices, the Joint Commission on Repatriations, the Joint Property Commission, the Joint Committee on Fostering Good Neighbourly Relations, the Panel for the Expedited Assessment and Processing of Claims, its own Permanent Secretariat and any other bodies it may establish, and provide for their financing.
- (v) The Group of Supporting States shall supervise, in coordination with the UN/OSCE, the International Disengagement Mission. If the mission is arranged by the UN, it will also report to the UN Secretariat and the Security Council, with the costs being defrayed through regular contributions for peace-keeping. If the mission operates under a UN mandate, but outside of the arrangements provided by the UN Secretariat, the costs will be shared among members of the Group of Supporting States and other contributing states according to a formula to be agreed by them.

Article 13. International Fund, Other Support for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction and Gradual Removal of Measures

- (i) The members of the Group of Supporting States will provide initial contributions to the International Fund and will invite other states to do likewise. Its Secretariat will present for approval by the Group of Supporting States a year-by-year budget for contributions to, and disbursements from, the fund.
- (ii) The members of the Group of Supporting States that have adopted economic measures in relation to the Russian Federation in the context of the present conflict will coordinate the gradual removal of such measures with one another, in according to the attached Schedule (Annex 5), provided the



present agreement is implemented, and continues to be implemented, in full. The states concerned may halt removal of measures or, in serious cases of infraction, restore such measures. Should they apply this provision, the Russian Federation is entitled to invoke the procedure under Article 16 (vi).

- (iii) The Russian Federation will contribute XXX Dollars to the International Fund in the first year of entry into force of this agreement, and XXX each year, until a Final Settlement is reached according to Article 13 (iii), or for period of ten years, whichever is the shorter period. It will in addition fully fund the work of, and the disbursements of, the Joint Property Commission as it relates to areas under its control.
- (iv) In addition to the costs noted above, the International Fund shall cover contributions to the costs for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the infrastructure of Ukraine and other projects proposed by the Executive Secretariat and approved annually by the Group of Supporting States and any other expenses approved by the Group of Supporting States.
- (v) Arrangements for compensation for compensation and assistance in view of damages incurred by the present conflict in situations other than those addressed by Article 9, affecting individuals, corporations and the sides shall be made through a Panel for the Expedited Assessment and Processing of Claims. This mechanism may draw on the data and documentation already compiled by existing mechanisms, including the UN and other registers of damage, and the data collected and recorded by the sides. Payments awarded by the Panel shall be covered by the International Fund.
- (vi) Funding for, and the work of, the International Fund shall be independent of other major fund-raising efforts for reconstruction in Ukraine and other activities connected with the present conflict, in particular the major annual donor conferences that may be foreseen. The first of these conferences will be held in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on 21 May 2005. While the funds raised at such further events shall be administered and disbursed separately from the International Fund, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Supporting States shall offer a report to these donor conferences on the status of implementation of this agreement.

Article 14. A New Pan-European Order of Security and Cooperation

- (i) The sides and the relevant members of the Group of Supporting States will prepare for the launch of a major conference for a New Pan-European Order of Security and Cooperation. This arrangement, in the mould of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act, will renew pan-European cooperation based on a model of cooperative security arrangements respecting the legitimate security interests of all.
- (ii) The meeting will be held in Paris, no sooner than five years from the entry into force of this agreement, and no later than fifteen years from that point. Exploratory meetings, followed by regular preparatory sessions on dedicated work-streams shall commence two years after entry into force.
- (iii) The following work streams will, *inter alia*, be addressed:



- a. Addressing mutual, legitimate security interests of all in Europe and moving towards a system of cooperative security;
- b. Reviving or replacing the OSCE institutions;
- c. Balancing conventional weapons in Europe;
- d. Considering limitations for tactical and theatre nuclear weapons;
- e. Common action to address common threats, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; hybrid warfare, etc;
- f. Confirming territorial arrangements in Europe;
- g. A final settlement concerning the present conflict relating to Ukraine;
- h. Deepening cultural ties between East and West, including in the areas of the human dimension;
- i. Coordination and cooperation mechanisms on issues of European and global concern, such as the preservation of the environment.

Article 15. Security Assurances

- (i) The sides enjoy the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, including the right to arrange in cooperation with others its forces and equipment necessary for the effective exercise of that right in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and this agreement.
- (ii) Existing security assistance agreements shall remain in force if the parties so desire and may be supplemented by other such arrangements, provided they comply with the terms of this agreement, in particular Articles 6 and 7.
- (iii) The attached draft of a Resolution for the adoption by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII (Annex 1) establishes a comprehensive and universal sanctions regime, applicable to whichever side launches an armed attack against the territory under the control of the other according to the terms of this agreement. The sides and Supporting States shall ensure adoption of that resolution by the UN Security Council.
- (iv) The draft resolution provides that the application of the sanctions regime so provided is suspended until the UN Security Council activates it through a Chapter VII resolution in case of an armed attack by one side against the other, or until the Group of Supporting States has decided, after receipt of a report by the Head of the International Disengagement Force, by a 3/4th majority of votes of all members present and voting, that an armed attack has been committed by one side against the other. The resolution moreover provides that once such a decision has been adopted and communicated to the UN Secretary General by the Executive Secretary of the Group of Supporting States, the UN Secretary-General shall so certify and the comprehensive sanctions regime shall automatically apply under Chapter VII, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, against the state identified as the author of the armed attack.

[Should it be impossible to achieve adoption of this automatic snap-back provision imposing comprehensive and universal economic sanctions in case of an armed attack having occurred, an alternative would be a commitment by all members of the Group of Supporting States to adopt such sanctions in



case of an armed attack being committed. Other states cooperating with the Group of Supporting States might associate themselves with that undertaking.]

- (v) In case of an armed attack, the side suffering the armed attack is entitled to rely on bilateral and multilateral assistance clauses concluded outside of the framework of the NATO Alliance.

VI. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 16. Disputes

- (i) The sides shall seek to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of this agreement through negotiations. The Executive Secretary of the Group of Supporting States may offer to facilitate such negotiations.
- (ii) Where such a dispute has not been resolved in view of the claimant within three weeks of having been officially brought to the attention the respondent, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Supporting States shall constitute a conciliation commission, consisting of two representatives each nominated by the sides, and three members drawn by the Executive Secretary from a list of conciliators maintained by the Secretariat of the Group of Supporting States.
- (iii) The conciliators shall issue their report, including a recommendation on the means or terms of settling the dispute, within three weeks of having been seized of the matter. The Commission will adopt its report by a simple majority of its members.
- (iv) The Group of Supporting States shall consider the response of the sides to the report and issue a finding in this regard. Should it find that a serious infraction of the agreement has not been addressed in line with the recommendation of the conciliator, it may recommend to its members and other states the suspension or reversal in whole or in part of the gradual lifting of economic measures;
- (v) Each member of the Group of Supporting States shall nominate two members to the list of potential conciliators. These shall be individuals of high international reputation and senior standing in the field of international law, mediation and conflict settlement.
- (vi) Where the Russian Federation invokes this procedure pursuant to Article 13 (ii), the Conciliation Commission shall be composed of two representatives nominated by the Russian Federation, and two representatives nominated jointly by the states against which the complaint is directed. A further three members not nominated for the list of potential conciliators by either the Russian Federation or the states against which the complaint is directed shall be selected jointly by the Executive Secretary of the Group of Supporting States and his or her two Deputies. The report of the Commission, to be



rendered within three weeks of the complaint having been lodged, shall be implemented by the states concerned.

Article 17. Concluding Provisions

- (i) This agreement is a treaty eligible for registration with the UN Secretariat. The sides shall arrange for registration as soon as the agreement enters into force.
- (ii) This agreement enters into force [on the day of signature] [on the day of ratification by both sides]. It shall be witnessed by the members of the Group of Supporting States who thus confirm consent to the provisions of the agreement affecting them.
- (iii) The UN Security shall be invited to adopt the attached draft resolution on the date of entry into force of this agreement. The sides and the relevant members of the Group of Supporting States pledge to support and vote for adoption of the draft.
- (iv) The Annexes to this Framework Agreement shall be an integral part of this agreement.
- (v) Nothing in this agreement shall be taken as deviating from the Charter of the United Nations and other rules or instruments in force for the members of the international community as a whole;
- (vi) Nothing in this agreement shall be taken as derogating from existing treaty obligations of Supporting States.
- (vii) Nothing in this agreement shall be taken as affecting the legal positions of the sides relating to territory.
- (viii) This agreement shall be equally authentic in its English, Russian and Ukrainian versions.

ANNEXES

- Annex 1. Draft Security Council Resolution
- Annex 2. Disengagement and Heavy Weapons Withdrawal
- Annex 3. Adjustment to the Line of Control
- Annex 4. Status of Forces Agreement
- Annex 5. Schedule Concerning the Gradual Lifting of Sanctions
- Annex 6. Procedures for the Operation of the Bodies established in this Agreement

Signed: _____
For the Russian Federation

For Ukraine

Witnessed: