Since the indefinite postponement of presidential and parliamentary elections in late 2021 and subsequent instability, the conflict has been characterised by the rivalry of two competing governments, the Government of National Unity (GNU) headed by Abdulhamid Dbeibah, and the Government of National Stability (GNS) initially headed by Fathi Bashaga, each claiming to represent the legitimate executive authority of Libya. These rivalries can be broadly overlayed with the contours of regional divisions. The GNU government receives backing from western armed groups, and the GNS government is aligned with the Libyan Arab Armed Forces led by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, and the eastern-based House of Representative (HoR). Although Bashaga heralds from a coastal town in the western region of Tripolitania and enjoyed support from some of the strongest western-based military forces, he was unable to translate his heritage and traditional power-base into support from western constituencies for the GNS. In fact, Bashaga’s inability to generate backing from western constituencies led to his replacement as Prime Minister of the GNS by Osama Hamad. Traditionally, the regional divide also encompassed the two rival legislative bodies, the eastern-based HoR and the western-based High Council of State (HCS). However, with their common interest in maintaining their positions of power by delaying parliamentary elections indefinitely, the two legislative bodies, and in particular their heads, HoR Speaker Agila Saleh and HCS President Khaled Meshri, have found ways to collaborate across the divide.

Institutional and subnational arrangements

The overarching narrative driving the east-west divide is a lack of consensus on the nature of the state. While there is agreement on the need for some degree of subnational governance, western constituencies broadly advocate for greater centralization, eastern constituencies demand a federal model that grants significant autonomy at the regional level, while southern constituencies argue in favour of greater decentralisation at the local level. Grievances over regional marginalisation have served political and military elites as a tool to mobilise support.

Peace talks

At present, there are two parallel peace process taking place. The United Nations has presented a peace plan that focuses on the preparations for elections to end the transitional period. Meanwhile, members of the HoR and of the HCS are opposed to UN-led mediation efforts and advanced their independent peace process, arguing that it is within the two legislative authorities’ mandate to prepare for elections.

Political arrangements

The HoR and of the HCS advocate for a negotiation phase to agree on a new unity government as part of their proposed transitional peace process. However, the United Nations is concerned that such negotiations may be utilised as a strategy to delay the facilitation of elections further. Meanwhile, the HoR and the HCS argue that a unified government is required ahead of elections to implement the electoral law in a manner that does not disadvantage either of the competing governments.

Elections

The HoR and the HCS insist on the 6+6 Committee composed of it delegates as the appropriate forum for negotiations on a constitutional basis for elections.

Financial arrangements

In addition to aspirations for greater political participation, regional divides are also driven by the perceived and real unequal distribution of oil revenues, the country’s main source of income. As part of the UN peace process, a financial review has been conducted that was to culminate in the unification of the country’s financial institutions. Particularly, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar expressed dismay over the GNU and aligned forces’ access to state resources for salary payments and to foreign currency to acquire military equipment on the international market. Thus, Haftar and aligned actors demand equal access to state resources and that their forces receive salary payments from the Tripoli-based Central Bank in Libya. Meanwhile, GNU financial and economic institutions demand that parallel (and illegitimate) financial and economic institutions discontinue the practice of spending (illegally) acquired printed banknotes and unauthorized bank loans.

Security arrangements

The United Nations peace plans foresee a unification of the country’s armed forces. For the HoR and Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, any unified army ought to be headed by Haftar which is unacceptable to the GNU and many western factions and communities, who say they have suffered violations of international humanitarian and human rights law at the hands of the Haftar led Libyan Arab Armed Forces, especially during the 2019 attack on Tripoli. In terms of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), the implementation of Article 8, which stipulates that the national armed forces fall under the leadership of the legitimate civilian authority, has proven particularly contentious.

Foreign interference

All parties to the conflict have condemned the active role of foreign actors in the Libyan conflict. Historically, Field Marshall Haftar and aligned forces received the largest share of financial and military assistance, both in terms of supply of military equipment and active operational support. Thus, it was the GNA, which enjoyed political backing from the international community, which was keen to see an end to foreign (military) interference. However, with the intervention of Turkey at the request of the GNA and in support of the GNU, Haftar and his allies are equally concerned about the active engagement of foreign actors. The withdrawal of foreign forces has been a key component of the recent ceasefire agreements.

17 February 2011

• People begin to gather in the streets inspired by the Arab Spring sweeping across the region.

26 February 2011

• The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1970 (2011) expressing grave concern at the situation in Libyan, demanding an immediate end to the violence, and calling for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population.

5 March 2011

• The National Transitional Council declares itself as the sole representative of Libya.

17 March 2011

• The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1973 (2011) authorising all necessary measures—excluding an occupation force—to protect civilians in Libya and to enforce the arms embargo, imposing a no-fly zone, strengthening the sanctions regime, and establishing a panel of experts.

June 2011

• Following a referral by the UN Security Council, the International Criminal Court issues arrest warrants for crimes committed during the revolution for Muammar Qaddafi, his son, Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi, and former intelligence chief Abdullah Senussi.

August 2011

• Tripoli is taken by NTC aligned forces, and the NTC announces its movement from Benghazi to Tripoli.

3 August 2011

• The National Transitional Council issues the Constitutional Declaration.

16 September 2011

• The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2009 (2011) establishing the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and partially lifting sanctions.

20 October 2011

• Reports emerge of the death of Muammar Qadhafi and the end of fighting in Sirte and other cities. The UN Secretary-General remarked that “Now is the time for all Libyans to come together, [and that] Libyans can only realize the promise of the future through national unity and reconciliation.”

23 October 2011

• The National Transitional Council formally assumes its role as the legitimate government based in Tripoli.

27 October 2011

• The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2016 (2011) welcoming the positive developments in Libya and encouraging the swift establishment of an inclusive, representative transitional Government of Libya.

7 July 2012

• Parliamentary elections for the General National Congress take place peacefully. The National Transitional Council formally hands over power on 8 August.

6 February 2013

• The General National Congress issues a decision on the formation of a constituent assembly to draft the new Libyan constitution.

May 2013

• The General National Congress passes the Political Isolation Law.

August 2013

• Militia leader Ibrahim Jadhran and affiliated Petroleum Facilities Guards forces took control of oil facilities in the Sirte basin and impose a blockade.

February 2014

• February Committee Proposal is issued.
• General Haftar questions legitimacy of the General National Congress.

20 February 2014

• Elections for the Constitutional Drafting Assembly are held.

25 June 2014

• Parliamentary elections for the House of Representatives take place. The elections are marred by low voter-turnout and the results were contested by several key constituencies. The international community recognize the election result as valid.

14 March 2014

• Prime Minister Ali Zeidan is ousted.

August 2014

• Following an escalation of violence, the House of Representatives relocates to the eastern city of Tobruk. Meanwhile, several remanent parliamentary members restore the General National Congress as a parallel legislative authority based in Tripoli.

14 August 2014

• Bernadino Leon assumes his role as the UN Special Envoy for Libya.

27 August 2014

• The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2174 (2014) calling for an immediate ceasefire in Libya and an inclusive political dialogue, as well as imposing sanctions on individuals and entities obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition and tightening the arms embargo.

6 November 2014

• The Tripoli-based Supreme Court ruled that the House of Representative is illegitimate and re-instates the General National Congress. The ruling has been deemed invalid as it was assessed that the decision was taken under duress from local militia groups. The international community continued to award recognition to the House of Representatives as the legitimate legislative authority.

4 November 2015

• Martin Kobler assumes his role as the UN Special Envoy for Libya.

17 December 2015

• Members of the Libyan Political Dialogue sign the Libyan Political Agreement, Skhirat, Morocco. The Agreement includes power-sharing arrangements for the executive authority and for the legislative authority and provisions for security reform, and paths the way for a two-year transitional period.
• The UN Special Envoy announced the signature of the Agreement by a wide representation of members of the House of Representatives and the General National Congress as well as public figures from Libyan political parties, civil society, municipalities and women groups. He welcomed the agreement, stating that “participants in the Libyan political dialogue have turned a page in the history of Libya.”

23 December 2015

• The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2259 (2015) welcoming the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement and calling for the formation of the Government of National Accord.

January 2016

• In accordance with the LPA, an interim government, the Government of National Accord, is formed, with Faiez Serraj as its Prime Minister and as President of a Presidency Council. Although, the House of Representatives fails to grant the GNA the vote of confidence and to adopt the Libyan Political Agreement as an amendment of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration.

17 March 2016

• The Constitutional Drafting Assembly commences drafting sessions in Salalah, Oman, under the auspices of the United Nations. The aim of the meetings is to consult and deliberate on the remaining constitutional issues yet to be resolved.

30 March 2016

• Prime Minister Faiez Serraj and cabinet members of the Government of National Accord arrive in Tripoli.

12 May 2016

• Receiving US military assistance, a Misratan-led and GNA-aligned force commences military operations to oust ISIL from the central town of Sirte.

22 September 2016

• The United Nations Member States call upon the House of Representatives to vote on a revised cabinet proposal and to constitutionalize the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA).

December 2016

• ISIL is expelled from Sirte by a Misratan-dominated but nominally GNA-affiliated coalition of forces dubbed Bunyan al-Marsous (BAM), which was formed in May 2016 and supported by U.S. military forces.

21 January 2017

• The League of Arab States, African Union and United Nations issue a joint statement reiterating their commitment to coordination and the need to engage with Libyan parties and stakeholders.

10 March 2017

• The League of Arab States, African Union, and United Nations met in Cairo, where they agreed to expand the coordination mechanism to include the European Union, forming a Quartet. The Quartet reiterates support and communicates concern related to violence in Tripoli and the Oil Crescent.

22 June 2017

• Ghassan Salamé assumes his role as the UN Special Envoy for Libya.

25 July 2017

• French President Macron hosts peace talks between General Khalifa Haftar and GNA Prime Minister Faiez Serraj that culminate in an agreement on a ceasefire. The two parties pledge to pursue a political solution. The negotiations inadvertently bolster the legitimacy of General Haftar.

29 July 2017

• A Constitutional Proposal is adopted by the Constitutional Drafting Assembly.

August 2017

• The International Criminal Court issues another arrest warrant for the Libyan Arab Armed Forces General Mahmoud Warfalli for committing extrajudicial executions, which amounts to a war crime.

20 September 2017

• The UN Secretary-General hosts a high-level event on Libya in New York. At the meeting, the UN Special Envoy for Libya presents an Action Plan, which is adopted by the Security Council. The Plan provides a pathway to free and fair elections within one year. The first step of the political process consists of amending the Libyan Political Agreement in an inclusive and consensual manner that addresses the main concerns hampering its implementation. To that end, the UN Special Envoy would convene representatives of the House of Representatives and High Council of State. The second stage of the political process would consist of a National Conference under the auspices of the Secretary-General to bring together members of the LPA institutions and a wide range of stakeholders from across the spectrum of Libyan society. Following the National Conference, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly will have the opportunity to review and refine its work, taking into consideration the observations and suggestions expressed at the National Conference.  The House of Representatives and the Constitutional Drafting Assembly should work in parallel to adopt the requisite constitutional and electoral framework for holding parliamentary and presidential elections within a year of the high-level event.

22 September 2017

• The Quartet met in New York, to endorse the UN Action Plan presented at the high-level event on Libya hosted by the UN Secretary-General.

25 September – 16 October 2017

• The United Nations facilitated a series of meetings between delegates from the House of Representatives and High Council of State, which formed the Joint Drafting Committee. The meetings were aimed at forging consensus on amendments of the Libyan Political Agreement. However, the HoR delegates end their participation in the meetings on 16 October. The parties continue to disagree over the selection criteria for electoral candidates, including whether candidates could be active members of the military, or persons accused of violating international human rights law, which would effectively exclude General Haftar and other powerbrokers from the electoral event. The negotiations formally end on 24 October without any agreement.

21 October 2017

• A second round of talks of the House of Representatives and High Council of State’s Joint Drafting Committee is concluded in Tunis, Tunisia. A first round of talks were concluded on 1 October. The talks were mediated by the United Nations and represented the first phase of the UN announced Action Plan. They aim to forge consensus on the formulation of amendments for the Libyan Political Agreement. While the parties were able to identify points of convergence, disagreements remain over the most contentious issues.

17 December 2017

• At the second anniversary of the Libyan Political Agreement, which foresaw a two-year transitional period, the UN reiterates its support for the political process. Meanwhile, General Khalifa Haftar calls the agreement void. The UN Special Envoy calls for presidential elections by the end of 2018.

17-19 January 2018

• The United Nations facilitates a meeting of over 60 local mediators to share experiences in mediating peace and ceasefire agreements. Participants call on the authorities to adopt a roadmap for national reconciliation that has buy-in from all the parties engaged in reconciliation efforts. Finally, they urged stronger coordination between all mediators, bodies and institutions working for reconciliation throughout Libya. Participants to the forum commit to work on the establishment of a national network of local mediators.

30 April 2018

• The Quartet meets in Cairo and expresses support for the UN Action Plan and other mediation efforts.

29 May 2018

• The International Conference on Libya is held in Paris, France. The parties agree to hold elections on 10 December 2018.

4 September 2018

• The United Nations mediates a Ceasefire Agreement between armed groups that have been fighting in Tripoli since 26 August. In the Agreement, the parties commit to:
  • • Cease all hostilities
    • Halt any further hostile movement that would hamper implementation of the ceasefire
    • Ensure civilians are not put at risk and human rights are respected as stipulated by national and international laws
    • Protect all private and public properties
    • Ensure the reopening of Mitiga airport as well as all roads in and out of the Capital
    • Refrain from taking any action that may lead to armed confrontation including all movement of forces, ammunition resupply, or any other action that could be viewed as generating tensions
    • Ensure that all groups under their command shall observe this Agreement

9 September 2018

• Parties to the Ceasefire Agreement reach consensus on the establishment of a monitoring and verification mechanism and the need to advance negotiations on security arrangements in the Greater Tripoli area.

6 November 2018

• Humanitarian Dialogue submits to the UN Special Envoy the Final Report of public consultations that form part of the National Conference process. The consultations lead to some points of consensus including:
  • • Libya’s unity and national sovereignty must be preserved, while recognizing local and cultural differences within a framework of decentralization
    • Rational and effective democratic governance is needed
    • Security is essential in daily life, with strong and independent security and military institutions based on national values, obedient to the rule of law and subject to civilian and judicial oversight
    • Unified sovereign and military institutions must be protected from political, partisan and regional interference
    • Libya’s national resources must be protected
    • Libya’s resources must be distributed fairly
    • The functioning of the state must be built on strong local governance
    • The transitional phase must be ended, definitively, with the adoption of a constitution based on a consensus that can unite the country
    • Safe, secure and transparent elections must be held when the minimal conditions are met, with no barriers to the full participation of all Libyans
    • National reconciliation must be achieved, based on traditional Libyan practices and values and with respect for the demands of justice

12 November 2018

• Italy hosts United Nations-mediated peace talks dubbed the Palermo Conference.

January 2019

• Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan Arab Armed Forces make significant military gains to control territory in Libya’s southern Fezzan region.

28 February 2019

• The UN Special Envoy hosts a meeting in Abu Dhabi, UAE, between of the Government of National Accord, Faiez Serraj, and head of the Libya Arab Armed Forces, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, where they agreed upon the need to end the transition through elections.

4 April 2019

• The Libya Arab Armed Forces led by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar launch operation “Flood of Dignity” to mobilize forces towards the capital Tripoli just days ahead of a scheduled UN-led National Conference, to commence on 14 April.

9 April 2019

• The UN Special Envoy issues an announcement postponing the National Conference due to the outbreak of violence. The National Conference is postponed indefinitely, representing the end of the peace process outlined in the Action Plan.

14 August 2019

• Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord, Faiez Serraj, and the Libya Arab Armed Forces led by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar reach agreement on an Eid al-Adha truce. The United Nations welcomes the truce by the GNA and LAAF, but expresses concern over violations and areas not under agreement.

January 2020

• The Libyan Arab Armed Forces and aligned armed factions capture the Sirte Basin and reinstate a blockade of oil terminals.
• Turkey makes an official announcement to inform of its military assistance to the Government of National Accord.

3 January 2020

• The Board of the Central Bank of Libya meets for the first time after having been divided for six years in their support of the two opposing conflict parties. The Bank issues much needed monetary policies, notably a devaluation of the national currency.

19 January 2020

• The Berlin International Conference on Libya is hosted by Germany. The Conference gathers high-level representatives from key member states engaged in Libya, namely Algeria, China, Congo, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and representatives from the United Nations, including the UN Secretary-General and the UN Special Envoy, the African Union, European Union, and League of Arab States. Given some states’ active engagement in the conflict, including backing opposing parties, the Conference aims to forge consensus among these actors on a path forward. The Conference causes controversy given the marked absence of Libyan representatives, but is also seen as critical to end foreign interference. Participants reach consensus on a number of key Conclusions and develop a Plan to operationalize the outcomes.

12 February 2020

• The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2510 (2020) endorsing the conclusions of the Berlin Conference on Libya.

June 2020

• Mass graves are discovered in the town of Tarhuna.

23 June 2020

• An international Fact-Finding Mission to Libya is established by the United Nations to assess the human rights situation in Libya and to record violations from 2016 onwards.

21 August 2020

• The Government of National Accord’s Prime Minister Faiez Serraj and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Agila Saleh, issue an announcement regarding the consolidation of a nationwide ceasefire, the establishment of a demilitarization zone in central Libya, and the resumption of oil production. The UN Special Envoy welcomes the statements made by Prime Minister Serraj and HoR Speaker Saleh.

16 October 2020

• The United Nations facilitates the first-ever, large-scale digital dialogue online with Libyan youth. About 1,000 youth participants from all regions of the country and abroad join the meeting. The objective of the digital dialogue was to gather views for the Youth Track, which started with its first meeting on Sunday 18 October. The outcomes of the dialogue also inform the UNSMIL-facilitated intra-Libyan dialogue tracks about the Libyan youth views for solutions to the outstanding security, political and economic issues.

23 October 2020

• As a result of UN-facilitated peace talks, the Government of National Accord and Field Marshall Haftar sign a complete and permanent Ceasefire Agreement. The parties agree that, within a maximum period of three months, all military units and armed groups on the frontlines shall return to their camps and that all mercenaries and foreign fighters shall depart from Libyan territory. The Agreement establishes a Security and Operations Room which shall propose and implement special security arrangements to secure the areas cleared of military units and armed groups.

7-15 November 2020

• The first round of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum is held in Tunis, Tunisia. The 75 delegates of the LPDF adopt the Roadmap for the Preparatory Phase of a Comprehensive Solution. The Agreement envisions parliamentary and presidential elections on 24 December 2021. Participants also agree on the need to reform the executive authority in line with the conclusions of the Berlin Conference. They outline the structure and prerogatives for the Presidency Council and a separate Head of Government, and also decide on eligibility criteria for these posts.

17 December 2020

• The UN facilitates a meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum which results in the establishment of the LPDF Legal Committee. Participants also discuss issues related to arrangements for national elections on 24 December 2021, and the selection mechanism for the interim executive authority.

19-20 January 2021

• The Constitutional Committee comprising delegates from the House of Representatives and High Council of State holds a meeting in Hurghada, Egypt. Participants agree on holding a constitutional referendum on the 2017 Constitutional Proposal ahead of the national elections scheduled on 24 December.

5 February 2021

• The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum selects a new unified interim executive authority. With 39 votes, the LPDF chooses the new executive authority composed of Mohammad Menfi as the President of the Presidency Council, Mossa Al-Koni and Abdullah Al-Lafi, as the other members of the Presidency Council, and with Abdulhamid Dbeibah as Prime Minister-designate.

8 February 2021

• Ján Kubiš takes up his role as the UN Special Envoy for Libya.

10 March 2021

• The newly reunified House of Representatives grants a vote of confidence for the Government of National Unity. This marks the establishment of the first unified executive authority since 2014. Over 70 parliamentarians split from the HoR in Al-Bayda in early 2019 to express their rejection of Field Marshall Haftar’s attack on the capital. The UN Special Envoy “applauds the House of Representatives (HoR) leadership and its members for coming together in unity on this historic day and for upholding the interests of their country and their people.”

16 April 2021

• The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2570 (2021) urging member states to withdraw all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya.

23 June 2021

• The Second Berlin International Conference is held. In the Conclusions of the conference, participants reach consensus on a number of key points. Most notably, they reiterate their support for the 24 December elections and the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement.

28 June – 2 July 2021

• The UN facilitates a meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Geneva, Switzerland, to consider a proposal by its Legal Committee for a constitutional basis for national elections on 24 December 2021. Ahead of the LPDF plenary meeting, the UN convened the Advisory Committee of the LPDF in Tunis from 24 to 26 June to consider bridging proposals from various members of the LPDF and to provide recommendations for the plenary meeting. The UN Special Envoy transmitted the draft proposal from the LPDF Legal Committee to the LPDF for review on 4 May.

11 August 2021

• The UN facilitates a virtual meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum to review four proposals for a constitutional basis for elections developed by members of the Proposals Bridging Committee. Participants discuss the proposals, make numerous suggestions on substance and procedure, and pledge to continue consultations, including with critical political and other stakeholders, with the aim to prepare for the next LPDF meeting. The Proposal Bridging Committee of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum held four meetings with the aim of forging consensus on options for bridging proposals, building on the Legal Committee’s draft, for a constitutional basis for the upcoming national elections on 24 December 2021.

30-31 August 2021

• The Consultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Neighboring States of Libya is held in Algiers, Algeria.

September 2021

• The House of Representatives debates and approves what it calls the electoral law for the 24 December elections. However, key issues remain unaddressed, compelling the UN Special Envoy to issue a statement on 30 October calling on the HoR to finalise its efforts on the electoral law and to support the High National Elections Commission with its preparations for the elections.
• The HoR passes a no-confidence motion against the Government of National Unity. The vote is considered controversial and not recognized by the international community.

30 September – 1 October 2021

• House of Representatives and High Council of State delegations hold consultative meetings in Rabat, Morocco, to negotiate a constitutional basis for elections.

6 October 2021

• The 5+5 Joint Military Commission convenes in Geneva to discuss the development of a comprehensive action plan for the withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters, and foreign forces from Libya. In accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement of 23 October 2020, and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the meeting is facilitated by the UN. The meeting is also part of the UN’s efforts to advance the intra-Libyan security track, in parallel with international efforts as part of the Berlin Conference on Libya. The parties issue an official statement and sign the action plan on 8 October.

21 October 2021

• The Libya Stabilization Initiative is held in Tripoli. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary A. Dicarlo remarks that “these dialogues must continue in order to sustain the momentum and ensure the full implementation of the Political Roadmap adopted by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF).”

12 December 2021

• Stephanie Williams assumes her role as the UN Special Adviser for Libya.

22 December 2021

• The Libyan High National Elections Commission announces that a new date for the first round of Presidential elections needs to be set by the House of Representatives, thereby postponing the elections scheduled for 24 December indefinitely. The UN Special Adviser states the following day that “to contribute to a solution of Libya’s political crisis and to durable stability, presidential and parliamentary elections must take place in the appropriate conditions, on a level playing field among all candidates to peacefully end the political transition and transfer power to democratically elected institutions.”

10 February 2022

• The House of Representatives nominates Fathi Bashaga as Prime Minister designate and passes a constitutional amendment of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration outlining a 14 month-long transitional period. The voting procedures have largely been assessed as invalid. This marks the beginning of a return to parallel institutionalism and a regional split of the country along east and west.

1 March 2022

• Fathi Bashaga forms a rival government.

3 March 2022

• The UN Special Adviser announces an initiative to form a joint committee from members of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State to agree on a constitutional framework for national elections. In response to the announcements, the Speaker of the House of Representatives pledges to join the initiative on 10 March, followed by a commitment to participate in the dialogue by the Chair of the High Council of State on 15 March.

15 March 2022

• The co-chairs of the Political Working Group of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya, namely representatives from Algeria, Germany, League of Arab States and the United Nations, hold a virtual meeting to discuss avenues to advance the peace process.

22 March 2022

• The UN Special Envoy holds a consultative session with the High Council of State delegates to the Joint Committee on the Libyan Constitutional Track in Tunis, Tunisia. At this point, the House of Representatives has not shared a list of delegates.

13-18 April 2022

• Under the auspices of the UN, the Joint House of Representatives and High Council of State Committee on the Libyan Constitutional Track is launched in Cairo, Egypt. Participants reach consensus on the internal regulations governing the work of the Committee and on the need for follow-up meetings. With the support of constitutional experts, the participants also negotiate technical clarifications on a number of important constitutional issues.

15-20 May 2022

• The Joint House of Representatives and High Council of State Committee on the Libyan Constitutional Track holds a follow-up meeting in Cairo, Egypt. The Joint Committee is able to reach initial consensus on 137 articles of the 2017 Constitutional Proposal. Disagreements persist on the most contentious issues addressed by the Proposal.

12-20 June 2022

• In a third and final round of meetings, negotiations between the Joint House of Representatives and High Council of State Committee on the Libyan Constitutional Track take place in Cairo, Egypt. The Joint Committee reaches consensus on some contentious articles in the 2017 Constitutional Proposal, but differences persist over the framework governing the transitional period leading to elections.

29 June 2022

• A second round of high-level meetings on Libya’s constitutional track concludes in Geneva, Switzerland. Under the auspices of the UN, the presidents of the House of Representatives and High Council of State meet to review provisions of the 2017 Libyan Draft Constitution, taking into account the agreement reached during the Cairo talks. Participants reach consensus on the following issues:
  • • Designation of the headquarters and distribution of seats for the two chambers of the legislative authority
    • Divisions of responsibilities among the president, prime minister, cabinet and local government
    • Design of the federal system, including the delineation and the number of governorates and their powers; intergovernmental fiscal transfer system; and; increased representation for cultural components

August 2022

• Speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, and President of the High State Council (HCS), Khaled Mishri, hold further discussions in Turkey on 1 August and Egypt on 14 August, to reach consensus on a constitutional framework for elections.

9 August 2022

• The 5+5 Joint Military Commission meet with UNSMIL in Sirte to discuss the implementation of the Libyan Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism.

25 September 2022

• Abdoulaye Bathily assumes his role as the new UN Special Envoy for Libya.

12 October 2022

• The co-chairs of the Working Group on International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya, in collaboration with the Presidency Council and the African Union, hold a meeting to explore avenues for national reconciliation efforts.

26-27 October 2022

• Representatives from Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States meet at Wilton Park to discuss the situation in Libya. Participants agree on the need for Libyan leaders to engage constructively together and for elections.

8 December 2022

• A meeting of the Security Working Group of the Berlin International Follow-up Committee is held in Tunis, in the presence of members of the Berlin process, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and officials of the Libyan Ministry of Interior. The UN Special Envoy in collaboration with France, co-chair the plenary session aimed at discussing next steps in the ceasefire agreement implementation, the reunification of Libya’s military institutions and election security. Participants agree to the establishment of a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration sub-committee of the JMC, in accordance with the 4th provision of the ceasefire agreement.

12 January 2023

• A preparatory meeting is held for a national reconciliation conference to be convened by the African Union and Libya’s Presidential Council in Tripoli later this year. The meeting brought together over 150 participants including prominent political, tribal, and religious figures, and representatives of the country’s political spectrum.

16 January 2023

• A two day-meeting with the 5+5 Joint Military Commission concludes in Sirte. The meeting brought together Libyan and UNSMIL ceasefire monitors. The Commission endorses terms of reference for its Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Joint Technical Sub-Committee that will be mandated with the categorization of the armed groups pursuant to the 4th provision of the ceasefire agreement.

7 February 2023

• A two-day meeting commences in Cairo, bringing together the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and the Liaison Committees of Libya, Sudan, and Niger. With the support of UNSMIL advisors, participants develop and endorse an integrated mechanism for joint coordination and information exchange between the three countries, to facilitate the process of withdrawal of foreign fighters.

8 February 2023

• The House of Representatives adopt the 13th Amendment to the 2011 Constitutional Declaration, which, according to the High Council of State President, was also endorsed by the High Council of State a few days later. The 13th Amendment sets out the roles of the president, prime minister and parliament, and a constitutional path to elections.
• The House of Representatives and High Council of State also establish the 6+6 Committee to deliberate on and formulate electoral laws under Constitutional Amendment 13. The Amendment is controversial and does not address key contentious issues such as the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates, and a clear road map and timelines to realize inclusive elections in 2023. Instead, it adds contentious issues such as regional representation in the Senate.

27 February 2023

• The UN Special Envoy announces the establishment of a High Level Panel for Elections to advance and guide the electoral process. According to the Envoy, the High-Level Panel is a new modality to ensure broader national ownership of the electoral process by Libyans from different walks of life beyond the country’s political and military elites. The Panel thereby seeks to widen the “negotiation process with key players to enable an electoral roadmap with specific timelines to guarantee the holding of inclusive, free and fair elections.” The Panel will ask electoral candidates to sign a code of good conduct.

15 March 2023

• The 5+5 Joint Military Commission convenes a meeting in Tunis, gathering military and security leaders from the western, eastern, and southern regions. Under the auspices of the UN, the Commission sought to negotiate an agreement on measures to ensure security for elections. Participants made the following commitments:
  • • Support free and fair elections
    • Continue dialogue and facilitate follow-up meetings inside Libya
    • Abstain from the use of force for political ends
    • Reaffirm their rejection of foreign interference
    • Implement confidence-building measures: criminalize acts of violence that jeopardize the political process; reject hate speech; criminalize acts of violence targeting civilians; prevent actions that impede or delay humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians; refrain from restricting free movement; reparation and redress for grievances resulting from former armed conflicts, and return of IDPs and refugees.

16 March 2023

• The Security Working Group of the Berlin Process International Follow-up Committee holds a meeting in Tunis. The meeting is led by the Working Group’s co-chairs, UNSMIL and the United Kingdom, and aims to advance the security track, including the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the reunification of military institutions. Participants include the Chief of Staff General Abdulraziq Al Nadhouri, Chief of Staff General Mohamed Al Haddad, members of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, and representatives of the other Security Working Group co-chairs, namely France, Turkey, Italy and the African Union.

26 March 2023

• The 5+5 Joint Military Commission convenes a meeting in Tripoli, gathering military and security leaders from the western, eastern, and southern regions. Participants agree on the following outcomes:
  • • Dialogue should be Libyan–led
    • Rejection of foreign interference
    • Commitment to the outcomes of their first and second meetings held respectively in Tunis and Tripoli
    • Rejection of fighting and all forms of violence
    • Continuation of work towards unifying the military institutions through the Chiefs of Staff; unifying the security institutions; and the rest of the state institutions
    • Formation of a unified government
    • Support for IDPs
    • Completion of national reconciliation and reparation efforts
    • Commitment to elections

7 April 2023

• The 5+5 Joint Military Commission convenes a meeting in Benghazi, gathering military and security leaders from the western, eastern, and southern regions. The meeting aims to build confidence among the military and security forces in the political process and to create a conducive environment for elections. The participants agree on a number of commitments:
  • • Adherence to the conclusions of the dialogue between the 5+5 JMC and the military and security leaders in Tunis and Tripoli
    • Support for all stages of the elections
    • Assistance to the 5+5 JMC and its Libyan Liaison Committees on the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters
    • Advancement of steps to address the problems of internally displaced persons and missing persons
    • Exchange of information on detainees held by both sides and consideration of steps to exchange detainees
    • Meeting in Sabha after the holy month of Ramadan

8 April 2023

• Libyan National Army authorities release six detainees from western Libya as a confidence-building measure.

16 May 2023

• The House of Representatives suspends Fathi Bashaga as the Prime Minister of the parallel Government of National Stability. He is replaced by Osama Hamad.

6 August 2023

• The Tripoli-based High Council of State elected a new leader, Mohammed Takala, to replace Khaled al-Mishri. The development adds more uncertainty to the peace process, as an agreement on electoral laws for the holding of national elections continues to be elusive.

29 September 2023

• The 6+6 Committee submits an amended version of the draft electoral laws to the House of Representatives.

2 October 2023

• The House of Representatives approved the draft electoral laws submitted to it by the 6+6 Committee.

4 October 2023

• The High State Council rejected the revised legislation on electoral laws, instead endorsing the 6+6 Committee’s previous version, as drafted in June 2023. The High State Council also withdrew its members from the 6+6 Committee. It contested some of the changes made, such as a provision allowing military officers to stand for election, which might allow Haftar to do so.

5 October 2023

• The House of Representatives issued the revised legislation on elections as binding laws and tasked Libya’s High National Elections Commission to implement those laws.
• The High State Council sent statements to UNSMIL, the House of Representatives and the High National Elections Commission, that the issuance of the electoral laws without its approval was unconstitutional.

9 October 2023

• The High National Elections Commission affirmed that it could begin to implement the electoral process, but called for a broader political commitment to ensure implementation.

12 October 2023

• In a statement, UNSMIL stated that it a ‘technical review’ had of the amended electoral laws had been completed, and that these laws could serve as a ‘working basis’ for holding elections, but that there remained ‘[c]ontentious issues that need to be addressed and resolved through a political settlement’. These issues included: the mandating of a second round of presidential elections even if one candidate receives a majority in the first round; the holding of parliamentary elections being contingent on success of presidential elections; and establishment of a unified interim government to organise elections.

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